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ABSTRACT
Though they originated as an insubstantial entity, United States Federal Courts have
become a virtual force as precedent setting tools to regulate various facets of society from business
to civil rights. Much of this metamorphosis can be attributed to their procedural rulebook, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such a large component of forming the nation’s legal
interpretations and traditions warrants evaluation to reveal its underlying principles and goals.
America’s jurisprudential history is plagued with philosophical battles, among these is a continual
debate over the principles of access versus efficiency in an attempt to pick a side. Over time, the
answer has alternated and evolved but not without social effects. As such, being informed on any
negative impact the functions of our court systems may have is important for academic, legal, and
civic communities alike. This research aims to contribute to current literature by revealing through
history and precedent the impact of procedure on litigation in federal courts while assessing its
current state through rule amendments. Though founded on principles of access and ease, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have through modern re-interpretation, become a barrier to court
access for average litigants. In practice, not only does this violate the spirit of the rules, but it is
also a precarious possibility for those with challenging claims or suing more resourced defendants.
This makes for a highly salient flaw which is revealed to be the result of a distinct modern leaning
towards philosophical principles of efficiency, sustained in the most recent and highly contentious
2015 amendments. Tracing the process of producing these displays that responsive democracy in
the arena of judicial rulemaking is alive and well, but not for those in favor of judicial access.
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I. Introduction
For nearly eighty years in United States district courts, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have functioned as the procedural rulebook for civil lawsuits. These detailed guidelines govern
every step of litigation for which adherence is key to successful completion. Today, they are a
regularly applied code and basic knowledge for legal professionals but these are more than mere
rules. They simultaneously reflect jurisprudential principles and serve as a mechanism of social
ordering. In order to fully understand the components and effects of modern civil procedure, it is
necessary to reflect on history.
It would seem reasonable to view the procedures as a natural product of the evolution of
American jurisprudence but history tells us otherwise. The current literature on procedural rules
tells a complex story beginning in 13th century England, migrating to the colonies, and filtered by
multiple actors before becoming a finished product which we still tailor from time to time. As a
result, where the rules began in spirit is not their existence today.
The modern courts have their problems, oft-named everywhere from popular media to
scholarly research. Procedure in particular is both a blessing and a curse. In federal courts, one of
the largest hurdles for litigants is actually seeing their day in court. All in the name of efficiency,
following complex procedure is crucial for a judge to even allow a case to enter the pre-trial phase,
plagued with more potential catches at every turn. Even in a system where every resource is readily
available, a basic knowledge is no longer enough to interpret it and be fully prepared.
A potential for disparate impact and a violation of original intent in terms of citizen access
are apparent here, warranting further exploration to uncover and consolidate acting influences on
this recent change. An understanding of the underlying principles answers the question of how
they came to exist and why, while providing perspective on balancing the ideals. Today is the
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culmination of centuries of trial and error in the legal profession, all of which can inform us on
how to move forward in a positive functional manner in the future.

Historical Antecedents
A thorough explanation in terms of American history, naturally begins with the colonies.
Colonial courts initially rejected the English system and in practice, pioneered new tactics based
on it.1 Beginning in the 13th century, English formal litigation took place in a dual court system of
common law and chancery, commonly known as law and equity.2 The common law courts were
identifiable by their writ system, jury trials, and single issue pleading.3 This formalistic system
was centered on consistent and predictable law application based on proof where specific issues
pointed to specific remedies.4 Courts of chancery were for “exceptional cases” where rather than
testimony the defendant’s conscience was searched with the resolution being specific relief.5 Such
cases led to a larger litigation package (as joinders were allowed) while being less bound by
procedure or precedent as the chancellor decided both law and fact as applicable.6 Common law
courts became known for their rigidity and chancery for their flexibility.
Once the states were established, Northern colonists distrusted the idea of separate courts.7
As a result, the earliest colonial courts had few writs, wide jurisdiction, and encouraged high juror
participation.8 Naturally, as the nation and amount of litigation grew, more organized procedures
were needed. English procedures slowly caught on with the colonies but the reliance on jurors

Stephen Subrin, “How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, no. 135 (1987): 926, accessed May 25, 2015.
2
Ibid. p. 914
3
Ibid. p. 914-915
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid. p. 918-919
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid. p. 926
8
Ibid. p. 927
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remained.9 All colonies provided the right to a jury trial where law and fact were decided.10 This
served as a means for controlling judges and by having participants see the law at work, garnered
support for laws themselves.11
After much contention over the democratic meaning of a judicial branch, the Constitution
established the Supreme Court and lower court system which would remain a work in progress for
some time. The Judiciary Act of 1789 was adopted during the first session of the First United
States Congress to establish the federal judiciary, its jurisdiction, and districts.12 At the time, many
citizens “feared” an independent federal judiciary may threaten state courts and restrict civil
liberties.13 The act was a compromise between those who wanted federal courts to exercise full
Constitutional jurisdiction and those who opposed any lower federal courts or wanted them
severely restricted.14 This was accomplished through provisions which effectively devolved some
powers to state courts or created shared powers.15 The change came with several procedural
difficulties, the most notable being the operation of the courts themselves and procedural
inconsistencies.16 To improve the system, the Process Act of 1792 aimed to bring consistency and
organization without crossing the states by authorizing federal courts to write rules for everything
except actions at law.17 The language of the act required a federal court to apply common law rules
of pleading and procedure in effect in the states.18 Meanwhile, state courts underwent their own
metamorphosis, making decisions not only about whether to have a dual court system but also in
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terms of procedure. Many sided with the English common law tradition and as a result, during the
19th century the courts picked up more restrictions.19 At the same time, treatises and law schools
replaced the apprenticing that previously trained lawyers, a change which put practical application
behind formal education.20
Prominent New York lawyer David Dudley Field sparked the state-based movement away
from common law pleading suggesting a then radical merger of law and equity to form a simpler
litigation process.21 His reasoning was that common law resulted in a system that obscured facts
and legal issues while equity cases did not necessarily need a separate court.22 The drafters using
equity as a model, focused on creating a simple universal procedure and expanded remedies all
with less documentation.23 Though inspired by courts of equity, it still featured many elements of
common law such as predictability garnered through minimal judicial or legal flexibility to
preserve notions of limited government and states’ rights.24 The resulting “Field Code” was a code
of civil procedure for New York state courts, one of the first sets of procedural rules created bearing
the goal of universal application causing many states to follow suit.25
Though state courts were making strides, lawyers in federal courts still felt the frustration
of working with the Process Act, mainly due to its lack of provisions for procedure where there
were none.26 Further, until 1842 when the Federal Equity Rules were adopted, it provided limited
equity rules (as there were few equity cases), so judges deciding equity cases were directed to look
to the precedents of the English Court of Chancery as suppliers of default equity rules. 27 In an
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attempt to resolve the problem, Congress enacted the Conformity Act of 1872, instead requiring
federal courts to conform their procedure to the current practice in their states.28 Federal courts
only had procedural autonomy over rules of evidence.29
Over time, this brought another issue for lawyers. By the 20th century, some states followed
common law and others followed code procedure.30 Some code procedure states merged law and
equity procedure into a civil procedure system while federal courts preserved the dual system.31
This was magnified by the Second Industrial Revolution, increased number of cases featuring
interstate commerce and those heard under diversity jurisdiction.32 Two cases very similar on the
facts, even those arising under the same substantive federal law, under the Conformity Act could
turn out differently due to the variation in state rules. For lawyers, there was a high risk of losing
cases due to an abstract unknown rule. Partially as a result, firms tended to stay small and not cross
state boundaries, generating an economic impact to the profession.33
During the last two decades of the 19th century, there were multiple attempts within the
American Bar Association to have the Conformity Act replaced with uniform federal rules, all of
which failed to win member approval.34 However, in the early 1900s, when change became timely
given the political climate, the ABA became a big part of launching the movement for reform.
Roscoe Pound addressing the association in 1906, discussed the issue of rigid procedure as a
judicial inhibition to substantive law, a new perspective which sparked the interest of many.35 By

Daniel Holt, “From Conformity to Uniformity: The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and The Rise of Federal Judicial
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shifting the rhetoric from substance to procedure, he was able to gain support from the
association’s mainly conservative base.36 At the time, the federal judiciary was being portrayed by
progressives as an obstacle to progress that could be removed through measures forcing judicial
restraint.37 To counter the liberal debate over substantive ideas, conservatives found it convenient
to start focusing on procedure.
In response to Pound’s sentiments combined with the political climate, the ABA
established committees which produced reports to suggest a remedy.38 One focused on Uniform
Judicial Procedure was established in 1911 and headed by Thomas Shelton, who produced an ABA
resolution advocating uniform federal procedure.39 He later served as Enabling Act lobbyist and
though wavering on the role of judges, ultimately valued flexibility over judicial rigidity.40 A
partial win took place in 1912 with the Supreme Court’s adoption of the new Federal Equity Rules
drawing mainly on simplified practice and documentation.41 This was oft cited by supporters as an
example of the purpose and improvement that could take place under simplified, uniform
practice.42
The ABA-led movement within the legal profession supported an authorization for federal
court rulemaking led by the Supreme Court as an opportunity for not only a system steeped in
uniformity but also flexible and response to lawyer’s needs. 43 Though a noble pursuit, it was
primarily a means of deflecting attention from conservative positions courts had taken on
socioeconomic issues.44 Calls for greater judicial efficiency were in reality attempts to reduce
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outcry for popular control over the judiciary.45 Many participants were indeed motivated as well
by the potential financial incentives to harmonious state procedures and a single federal
procedure.46 Firms whose small size was born of necessity had much to gain from multistate
practices during a time in which interstate business was increasing.
After Shelton’s death in 1931, Senator Walsh of Montana, member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee emerged as chief opponent of the measure, arguing that uniform procedure would be
unduly burdensome to the profession to develop and track.47 Partially due to this, the uniform
federal rules bill failed to pass the Senate for over a decade.48 This pattern continued until William
Taft, supporter of uniform civil procedure from his presidency through tenure as a Supreme Court
Chief Justice, made moves that opened space for reform.49 Part of his efforts to increase efficiency
included greater authority to assign judges nationwide, which led to the creation of the Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges, later renamed the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1922.50
This created an additional motivation for abandoning conformity, as judges could find themselves
hearing cases in different states.51 In 1933, Senator Walsh died before taking office as President
Roosevelt’s first Attorney General and Homer Cummings, strong proponent of the procedure bill,
was appointed in his place.52 With the president’ support, he recommended its passage in 1934 and
months later, the Rules Enabling Act passed both houses of congress.53
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The first battle was over the big merger. Charles Edward Clark, dean of Yale Law School,
co-authored, published, and widely disseminated an article arguing that federal procedural reform
had to include a full merger of law an equity.54 The rules, which were initially to be drafted by the
Office of Attorney General came under control of the Supreme Court where an advisory committee
was developed to draft them.55 The formative group included Clark, along with lawyers,
professors, and politicians of the time from all ideological perspectives.56 During the drafting
process, the “Pound-Clark” vision prevailed as the major theme, the idea that procedure should
step aside and not interfere with substance.57 Clark, a former civil trial lawyer with small case
experience, perceived the need for government to play a more active role in society and procedural
reform as a means for social control.58 The insertion of this perspective into what was a deeply
conservative initiative changed the underlying focus and direction of this project.
Clark’s dominance in the drafting process was potentially due to sending his agenda in the
form of a first draft in advance to the other committee members.59 As a group, they built from
these ideas and those in use by the states to develop a rulebook for civil procedure, making tough
decisions and trying to predict the effect of each rule along the way. Their drafts were circulated
nationwide for critique before becoming law in 1938 by means of congressional inaction.60
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unify law and equity, replacing common law and
code pleading with a uniform system for all federal courts. This system of resolving legal disputes
is based on notice pleading, allowing litigants to use the machinery of the courts to compel
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discovery of evidence and hold open testimony to prove the case.61 It is less formal and technical
in terms of requirements and application, meaning plaintiffs are less likely to face dismissal due
to technicalities or language disparities because the details are left for later. This is an equitable
notion, by nature, due to its focus on the legal issue in question rather than the ability of a litigant
to construct a formal notice or argument. In addition, the rules introduced what is now an essential
component of the modern process, pretrial conferences to help judges manage caseloads.62
In 1957, Congress amended the act creating the Judicial Conference of the United States
to consolidate power for advising the Supreme Court on revisions to procedural rules.63 They also
appointed a standing committee and advisory committees for each set of federal procedural rules
to generate efficiency and responsiveness to the needs of the profession.64
The rules have been revised every few years since the mid-1940s to the extent that today’s
rules in certain areas vary greatly from what the original drafters put together. In 2007, they were
completely rewritten for ease of understanding but not substantive changes.65

Elements of Change
Central to the historical context of the federal rules development are the issues of
federalism and states’ rights. This centrality is proven by the fact that once FRCP becomes law,
no further major reform takes place. Instead, amendments are only made directly to these rules.
Many facets of them have since been adapted with the ostensible purpose of procedural ease, but
always preserving the place of FRCP in federal courts. Historically speaking, such preservation
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caused its lifespan to be longer than its predecessors which implies that this set of rules possess a
successful element which the others did not. That element is general applicability.
From the beginning, the American system of dual federalism has impacted the very
underpinnings of national governance in every manner. The origins of federal-state interactions
are characterized by a distinct leaning towards states’ rights. The Articles of Confederation lent
few federal powers and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution alone only gives the government
some leverage power.66 Ideologically, the background and political society were divided. The antifederalists disliked Constitutional powers being divided in such a manner while the federalists saw
states as impeding the development of commerce, private property, and strong federal government
as key to hegemony.67 The Bill of Rights manifested among other things as a compromise between
the two sides of debate.68
The original leaning towards states’ rights put into practice is what led to a patchwork of
practices, rules, and regulations across the former colonies. Not only did this negatively impact
citizens and businesspeople alike, but also trickled over to create an unnecessary burden on the
legal profession and federal courts. In every predecessor to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the procedure itself bound the federal courts to the states will regardless of how inconvenient or
procedurally challenging.
Initially, proponents of change introduced rules based on the notion that if popular and
useful, the states will pick them up and follow them. When these did not work out, they moved on
to develop something new. The most extreme example of this being the Conformity Act, requiring

“The Question of States Rights: The Constitution and American Federalism (An Introduction)”, Exploring
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federal courts to adhere to procedural rules per state.69 Though this clearly is a setup for failure,
the legal profession worked hard to make it at least functional. Increasing differences between the
court systems made it hard, especially once states began to abolish distinctions between law and
equity jurisdiction while the Supreme Court resisted doing such a thing. 70 The most confusion
resulted from the rise of cases in the post-World War 1 economic boom dealing with issues of
business and commerce, magnifying every procedural issue being faced. 71At the same time, the
country experienced an ideological shift towards a strong federal government and questioned how
many rights states really had instead of taking their expansive autonomy for granted.72 Though the
Great Depression reduced the amount of litigation, it led citizens and politicians alike to take a
warmer view towards federal intervention.73 The New Deal was just one example of how a strong
national government could be a positive change for everyone. In the legal profession, the
differences which complete state control of procedure allowed came to be seen as an impediment
rather than natural. Ironically, federal regulation could actually be freeing.
Once the Enabling Act was passed in Congress, it was groundbreaking legislation. For the
first time, the judicial branch was placed in complete procedural control of civil cases brought
before federal courts. As a result, over the years which followed, the rules or a version of them,
were adopted by each state. In a 1986 study, forty-eight years after the rules passage, twenty-two
states were found to have replica procedural systems and a total of ten more with close systems
differing by technicalities.74 What we see here is once the federal government took leadership in
their own courts to further efficiency and display leadership, state courts for the most part followed.
See Holt, “From Conformity to Uniformity,” 48-51
Ibid.
71
See Federal Judicial Center, “Equity Jurisdiction in Federal Courts”
72
See Exploring Constitutional Law, “The Question of States Rights”
73
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accessed July 5, 2015.
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Of notable mention is the fact that the judiciary through the drafters did not take this as an
opportunity to ignore what worked for the states. The big change of merging of law and equity
which took place through the federal rules was borrowed from its successful practice in the states
who did so, calling the combination a “civil action”.75 Federalism, in practice here, worked
properly by having mitigating effect on both parties.

In Theory
The origins of the American system come from the English dual court system of common
law and equity. These refer back to differing legal theories regarding the role of the courts in
society and best practices for them. The common law theory is based on ancient custom and
associated with a conservative nature, favoring procedure based in custom and judicial reason.76
This produces consistent and predictable application of the law focused around proof to determine
monetary damages. The judge’s role here is minimal as the system provides both procedure and
remedy. 77
Equity as a theory originated as a medieval law of fairness in property rights providing the
modern equivalent of specific performance.78 It is based on individual justice by having cases
decided according to the offender’s conscience and taking a liberal view towards settling matters,
allowing personal exemptions and focusing on flexibility.79 This produces a somewhat random
system because of the variety of factors and types of relief possible. As a result, the judge’s role is

See Federal Judicial Center, “Equity Jurisdiction in Federal Courts
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critical, they are tasked with deciding law and fact along with its application under the
circumstances.80
Much of the history of civil procedure is about the process of striking a balance or a leaning
towards one of these court systems and thus their underlying theories of jurisprudence. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, in abolishing separate courts, spoke to the desire for a common law
system with an equitable process. The drafters wanted a simple, streamlined process that was
organized and efficient yet uncomplicated. Having the experience in which the rules were
sometimes too numerous judicial officers themselves to decipher was convincing enough that
enduring an incredibly formal system just to get a day in court was unnecessary. Due to this, they
turned towards the idea that judges should be unhindered, rather than made to focus on containment
of the case for speedy resolution.81 This meant the style of pleading and correspondence with the
court would require less documentation and legal articulation as those details were for later
resolution.82
In other words, the main idea was that litigants in this system would not win by presenting
a better case, they would win by having a better case. Though quite liberal in nature, this reform
had roots in substantive notions of justice. Without procedural traps to look out for (or seek,
depending on one’s goal in litigation) litigants can focus more on having their day in court. Having
this be less of a concern when trying to resolve a legal matter also maintains equal access to the
system. An uncomplicated system is one the common citizen can participate in and have an opinion
about. It is neither incomprehensible nor inaccessible, but subject to the scrutiny of the masses.

See Subrin, “How Equity Conquered Common Law,” 918-920.
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The original nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not only a very efficient change
of theoretical pace for the federal courts but also a democratic one.
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II. Original Practice under the Federal Rules
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were established primarily as a response to the
patchwork of national rules governing the litigation process in federal courts. As a result of rulemaking being enacted mainly per state or jurisdiction, the lack of cohesion made it difficult for
litigants and their attorneys to successfully present claims before court. As the number of cases
before federal courts increased along with the number of multistate law firms, professional and
judicial advocates began to call for greater uniformity. The resulting movement culminated in the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 which enabled the federal judiciary to set their own rules for the first
time. Four years later, the Federal Rules were approved and took immediate effect in courts
nationwide. Since 1938, the utility and proper usage of various procedural establishments created
by the rules have been put to question.
Scholars have divided the history of American civil procedure into four mainly distinct
eras. The first begins with the nation’s founding, the second with the introduction of code pleading,
the third with the inception of the Federal Rules, and the fourth characterized by a major shift away
from tenets of the Federal Rules beginning with late 20th century precedents. This chapter is a
review of the third era’s procedural tenets, the original cornerstones of legal practice under the
Federal Rules.
Among its many functions, the Rules Enabling Act acted to forbid courts from enacting
rules which would “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”83 Establishing procedural
order was intended to assist substantive law rather than influence its application. This concept is
further explicated within the rules themselves. Rule one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is

Suzette Malveaux, “A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its
Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights,” Washington University Law Review, no. 2 (2014): 459-460, accessed August
18, 2015.
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a statement of intent, explaining that the rules are to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.”84 The Federal Rules, in their original state carried several
intentions aimed at maintaining access and efficiency to and for the courts. Specific major elements
of original practice reviewed in this section are uniformity and simplicity, pleading, discovery, the
motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and judicial intervention. Following the review of original
practice cornerstones is an exploration of precedents established under this era.

Uniformity and Simplicity
A major goal of the Federal Rules was simplicity for litigants, including less procedural
technicalities and “traps” which could make or break a case.85 Drafter Charles Clark emphasized
that the rules would be a simple and flexible system of procedural steps in which the merits of the
case are at all times stressed.86 Not only would these procedures be simple to follow, but also apply
in a uniform manner so that national practice could become more cohesive for the ease of judges,
lawyers, and the public.87 To accomplish this, the Rules Enabling Act established the Supreme
Court as a rulemaking authority which would make rules to apply the same way in all cases.88 Such
a notion has been labeled by scholars as “trans-substantivity,” the idea that the rules will apply to
all federal civil action in the same manner regardless of the substantive right being pursued.89

James Maxeiner, “The Federal Rules at 75: Dispute Resolution, Private Enforcement, or Decisions According to
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Pleading
Historically, pleading helped organize a case so it could be understood in terms of what
legal consequences would stem from the circumstances.90 Over time, courts came to require
varying extents of technicality within a plaintiff’s complaint, the more extreme ones being what
the rules drafters sought to avoid. The Federal Rules freed parties from the need to state their case
in a specified manner or adhere to semantic requirements. 91
Rule 8, General Rules of Pleading, explains what plaintiffs and defendants must follow.92
Rule 8a states that pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction”, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”
and “a demand for the relief sought.”93 Notably, the pleading standard does not require parties to
establish a precise legal ground of claims.94 In sum, the procedure for pleading focuses on “notice
pleading,” a non-technical manner of setting forth claims and defenses, focused on letting the
opposing litigants know the cause of action being alleged and remedy demanded.95 Creating a
contrast from code pleading and common law, the parties are to plead facts and the court is to help
parties identify the legal and factual issues.96 This process can occur throughout the pretrial
process, evidenced by Rule 15, which freely allowed amendment of pleadings “when the
preservation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby”.97
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Discovery
Wide discovery essentially enabled parties to secure any information relevant to the subject
matter at issue in the litigation.98 The Federal Rules largest impact has been said to be the
liberalization of pretrial discovery.99 The drafters of the rules believed that mainly unrestricted
discovery provisions would help the parties reach settlements or avoid trial and involve no great
cost or burden to the system.100 The premises were that more is better and discovery should be a
lawyer’s pursuit with judges taking as little part as possible.101 Discovery serves as a device to
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, obtain evidence for use at trial, and secure
information about evidence that may be used at trial.102 The rules were to restrain the use of
information but not the acquisition of it.103 In general, unless limited by court order parties may
obtain discovery regarding “any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense”.104 The original text of Rule 26(a) invited what scholars have dubbed “unlimited
discovery”. 105

Motion to Dismiss
Aware that among many meritious claims entering the federal court system would be some
of a frivolous nature, the drafters sought to create mechanisms by which defendants could assert
aid the court in disposing of claims. Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules provides seven defenses that
can be asserted by motion. These include lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal
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jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, insufficient service of process, failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to join a party.106 Among these, Rule 12(b) (6),
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is the main mechanism for the motion to
dismiss.107 It allows defendants to assert that the plaintiff has not submitted a complaint containing
an actual allegation and/or a litigious claim, thus there are no grounds to move forward with
litigation. This tool allows a judge who agrees with this assertion to quickly dispose of the case.

Summary Judgment
For the drafters, summary judgment was an exceptional remedy with a limited role.108 The
motion for summary judgment was designed for identifying trial worthy issues, in other words,
cases in which the facts themselves were involved in the dispute.109 According to Rule 56,
Summary Judgment, “the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law”.110 Also, the court may consider summary judgment on its own after “identifying for the
parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.111 This ability is inspired by the idea
that part of the court’s job is to help parties identify the legal and factual issues of their case.

Judicial Intervention
Because the rules placed minimal requirements on parties and aimed to leave the ultimate
determination of legal issues and application of law for the judge, a noteworthy amount of judicial
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freedom was necessary as well. The amount of judicial power devolved through application of
procedure is seen in their wide ability to dispose of cases or claims.112 For example, Rule 11
required attorneys to sign pleadings with the clients to avoid fictitious claims but also authorized
judges to strike pleadings that were without good grounds and permitted them to sanction attorneys
for violations.113 As alluded in the previous section, summary judgment as well is an example of
wide judicial discretion in disposing of cases as Rule 56 was a nearly new device at the time.114
Even in cases for which the judge is not sole arbiter of the outcome, those tried by jury, judicial
involvement is encouraged. Rules 49(c), 49, and 51 provide guidance and requirements for judges
in cases tried by jury including juror instructions, verdict polling, and assistance in understanding
their duties.115

Precedent in Action
Dioguardi v. Durning (1944) and Conley v. Gibson (1957) are the seminal third era cases
in which the courts rule in favor with the procedures as outlines in the original Federal Rules. Both
cases deal with pleadings rejected at the district court phase but ultimately upheld as acceptable
by higher courts. The reasoning provided by the justices and their suggestions within created
precedent setting opinions on the issue.
In Dioguardi, John Dioguardi, an immigrant and pro se plaintiff asserted grievances
against the Collector of Customs of the Port of New York.116 He was upset over the Collectors
handling of a public sale of merchandise that he attempted to import from Italy.117 Dioguardi drew
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his own complaint alleging factual circumstances in broken English which the district court
dismissed for failure to state a claim.118 Judge Clark, principal drafter of the Federal Rules, wrote
for the Second Circuit in overturning the district court’s Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal of Dioguardi’s
action, finding enough information within the complaint to satisfy the rule 8(a) (2) pleading
standards.119 Judge Clark’s opinion noted that the rules no longer demanded “facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action” which was the old code pleading requirement.120
Thirteen years later, the new pleading standard was reconfirmed in Conley v. Gibson. At
one time, Conley was the fourth most cited decision by the federal court and had been called “the
most important decision on pleading of the twentieth century.121 In Conley, a group of AfricanAmerican railroad workers sued their union under the Railway Labor Act alleging that the
collective bargaining agreement gave the employees certain protections from discharge and loss
of seniority.122 However, the railroad eliminated forty-five jobs held by African-American workers
who were terminated or demoted and filled their positions filled with Caucasian workers.123 The
plaintiffs alleged that the union failed to give them protection comparable to Caucasian employees,
thus failing to represent them “equally and in good faith”.124 The district court dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and the appellate court affirmed, but the Supreme Court found
jurisdiction and further considered the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint.125
Here, the court set forth the new standard for considering a motion to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court famously stated “a complaint should not be
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dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim...”126 Pleadings only need to “give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” to survive a motion to dismiss.127
Judges were to accept all factual allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the
pleader.128 The motion to dismiss was to be denied except in clear cases.129 Applying that standard,
the court found that the plaintiff’s allegations if proven, could establish a breach of the union’s
statutory duty to represent their workers fairly and without hostile discrimination.130
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III. Modern Practice under the Federal Rules
The third era of civil procedure lasted for approximately fifty years following the rules
inception. In function, it was the clearest representation of the rule drafters aims in revamping civil
procedure both to prevent the confusion that results from non-uniformity and create an openness
that would not shut out certain groups of litigants. Under original practice, litigation became two
parties setting their claims before the court, the ultimate fact finder and applier of law, through an
open and simple process. Under the rare circumstance that the claim was clearly without merit or
presented a non-issue, the parties and the court had mechanisms by which to rid themselves of the
matter. Overall, the third era was quite liberal in nature, reflecting an attitude of inclusion and
openness that has not been seen since.
Modern practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure composes the fourth era of
civil procedure, characterized by a departure from the tenets of original procedure. 131 The fourth
era is not marked by a distinct policy shift or official change in methods but rather an organic
movement composed of individual judicial decisions and political rhetoric.132 133 This chapter is a
review of the fourth era’s procedural tenets, the modern cornerstones of legal practice under the
Federal Rules.
The original purpose of the rules remains unchanged, rule one still provides that the rules
are to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”.134 Only minor
changes to the actual text governing civil procedure have been made yet major shifts in case
outcomes have been observed. The specific major elements of modern practice reviewed in this
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section are uniformity and simplicity, pleading, discovery, the motion to dismiss, summary
judgment, and judicial intervention. Following the review of modern practice is an exploration of
precedents established under this era.

Uniformity and Simplicity
Clearly, simplicity for litigants has been a goal of the Federal Rules since their inception.
The review of original practice showed that the drafters made simplicity and flexibility a priority
in establishing these rules. The main reason the rules came to be was to accomplish transsubstantivity and foster the creation of an understandable guide to civil litigation. 135 They wanted
to avoid procedural traps or the possibility of them being created for litigants. Under modern
practice, uniformity has been somewhat reduced by the proliferation of local rules but simplicity
is still a priority.136 One procedural element which has seen increased usage in the fourth era,
judicial case management, has even been said to have increased the courts efficiency in making
litigation a smooth process.137 Generally speaking, following the rules is a straightforward process,
but meeting the varying burdensome standards can be troubling for litigants.

Pleading
The goal of pleading is to organize a case so it can be understood in terms of what legal
consequences may stem from the circumstances.138 The Federal Rules aimed to free parties from
needing to state their case through an arduous process. Rule 8a in General Rules of Pleading states
that pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”,
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“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “a
demand for the relief sought”.139 Originally, the Federal Rules only required notice pleading of
facts with free amendment.140
In recent practice, however, judges have applied more demanding pleading standards
resulting in more dismissals for failure to state a claim.141 This new standard was established in
Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly and has been named plausibility pleading.142 Following this
precedent, courts have been compelled to demand enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.143 This has caused the function of a complaint to be transformed from a
limited role to one which can determine the outcome of a case.144 Rather than simply stating a
claim, plaintiffs are now required to present a facially plausible allegation during the pretrial
process and possibly before discovery. Reaching this standard varies by the judge’s subjective
interpretations of the claim and how much reliable information is included within.

Discovery
A substantial tenet of the original Federal Rules practice, designed to enable litigants to
bring all necessary facts in support of their claim was wide discovery. The acquisition of
information was not to be restrained outside of court orders and privileged matters.145 146Over time,
this has changed. Discovery is one of the few areas of the Federal Rules which has faced substantial
amendment in modern practice. These amendments resulted from a philosophical movement away
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from a trial on the merits and the open information which results to judicial gatekeeping and
avoiding frivolous suits. 147
In 1980 and 1983 rule 26(a) was amended, these changes authorized judges to limit
“duplicative” or “unduly burdensome” discovery in an attempt to protect parties right to an
economic decision on the merits.148 In 1993, seeking to further the same objective, rule 30 was
amended to place limits on depositions and rule 33 for interrogatories.149 Finally, in 2000, rule
26(b)(1) was modified, limiting the scope of discovery to relevant material.150 These amendments
have transformed discovery from a largely unrestricted process to one that occurs under close
watch and scrutiny of the courts. Again, the determination of what meets these new standards is
determined in a subjective manner.

Motion to Dismiss
Rule 12(b)(6), known simply as “failure to state a claim”, is a mechanism asserted by
motion from the defense for dismissing cases of a frivolous nature without burdening the court
system or opposing litigants.151
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A remedy originally designed for specific circumstances, the

motion to dismiss has now largely become a tool of judicial power. Plausibility pleading, explained
in a previous section, was in part motivated by a desire to develop a stronger role for the motion
to dismiss as a tool to filter the supposed excess of meritless litigation, deter abusive practices, and
contain costs.153 A defendant can now easily and quickly move pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) that the
plaintiff has not put forth a plausible claim, as this is a lower pleading standard than originally
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needed. This makes the court determine factual matters and their merits at the beginning of the
case, before discovery, giving the plaintiff a high burden to overcome. The standard for dismissal
has moved from a simple lack of allegation or claim to the lack of a plausible claim, a change
which promotes a high level of judicial discretion.154

Summary Judgment
Summary judgment began as a method of disposal for cases with no factual disputes.
According to Rule 56, Summary Judgment, “the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law”.155 Under original practice and today, this enables the court to be more efficient
in quickly providing a remedy in cases that did not necessitate full, protracted, and expensive
litigation. Summary judgment can be ordered after the motion of either party or as a result of the
court’s independent evaluation of the parties’ claims.156 Like the motion to dismiss, summary
judgment faces greater usage as judicial discretion in determining a trial worthy issue becomes
commonplace. When the remedy is appropriate is a much contended issue as the Summary
Judgment Trilogy cases, explored later in this section demonstrate.157 These and other judicial
decisions made during modern practice have made the previous exceptional remedy a focal point
of litigation.158 Similar to the motion to dismiss, responding to a motion or acting independently,
judges are prompted to review the merits of a case and possibly resolve trial-worthy issues without

See Miller, “Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits,” 339
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, §56
156
Ibid.
157
See Miller, “From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal,” 12
158
See Subrin, “The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure,” 1851
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An Illustration of the Tension between
Access and Efficiency in American Courts 30
154
155

having a trial.159 Perhaps as a result, studies show that less than half the cases that encounter a
summary judgment motion will survive it.160

Judicial Intervention
Under original practice, judicial intervention and case management were a priority for the
drafters to enable. Much power was given in the ability to dispose of cases and guide juries in
making their decisions. The main difference between original and modern practice here is again
how the rules are being used. Once judges were empowered to made wider use of the latitude their
positions afford, which came from both the judicial and political realm, they did so.161 162 Where
judges could not simply do away with non-meritious litigation, they have sought to bring a certain
organization and gatekeeping to the litigation process.
Mainly as a response to the 1960s litigation explosion, case management has become a big
part of civil litigation, particularly in federal courts.163

164

This introduced meetings and

conferences to discuss elements of the case and obtain judicial approval before moving forward.165
Over time, meetings to arrange cases became meetings to settle cases as settlement and referral to
alternative dispute resolution became commonplace early in the litigation process.166 167 With this,
judges became the key players in moving dispute resolution from the courtroom to a host of other
locations or simply not at all.
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Precedent in Action
In Chapter 2, two seminal fourth era cases Dioguardi v. Durning (1944) and Conley v.
Gibson (1957) were explored as examples of the real precedent setters under original practice.
Their holdings essentially set notice pleading as the standard and limited the role of the motion to
dismiss and summary judgment. This open concept of pleadings opened the court to a diverse
group of litigation over time which has been theorized to contribute to the litigation explosion of
the 1960s.168 The judicial response to the litigation explosion consisted of efforts to constrain the
size and scope of litigation before them.169 This change of pace is represented by a number of
fourth era cases, five of which are explored here in two distinct sets based on subject area.
The first set of cases is widely referred to as the “Summary Judgment Trilogy”, it includes
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v. Zenith Radio Corp, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, and Celotex
Corp v. Catrett. This is a group of cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1986 focusing on the
issue of summary judgment which brought forth the precedent lower courts have been following
throughout modern practice.
Matsushita involved an action in Federal Court between 21 Japanese corporations that
manufactured and sold consumer electronic products and American corporations that
manufactured and sold television sets.170 In dispute was an allegation that Matsushita illegally
conspired to drive American firms from the market by engaging in a scheme to fix and maintain
artificially high prices for television sets in Japan and fix and maintain low prices for the sets
exported and sold to the United States.171 This claim alleged a violation of multiple American
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regulatory acts.172 After years of discovery, Matsushita moved for summary judgment.173 The
District Court directed parties to file evidentiary statements, most of which was found inadmissible
or failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged conspiracy.174
As a result, summary judgment was granted in Matsushita’s favor.175 The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision after determining that much of the evidence was admissible with reasonable
evidence of conspiracy.176
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the evidence which the Court of Appeals
relied on (a “five company rule” and minimum prices for exports) could not provide a claim.177
According to the court, to survive a summary judgment motion, respondents must establish a
genuine issue of material fact and if the factual content renders the claim implausible, they must
offer “more persuasive evidence to support their claims than would otherwise be necessary”.178
The direct evidence on which the Court of Appeals relied was said to have “little relevance to the
alleged conspiracy” and failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory
pricing.179 In the absence of any rational motive to conspire, pricing practices, conduct overseas,
and price-distribution agreements cannot create a genuine issue for trial.180
Decided the same day, Celotex further affirmed the court’s crackdown on allegations
lacking evidence. The case began as a widow’s wrongful death action arising from her late
husband’s exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the Celotex
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Corporation.181 Months into the case, Celotex filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that
during discovery the plaintiff failed to produce evidence supporting her allegation that the decedent
was exposed to their products, arguing that the documents produced were inadmissible hearsay.182
The court granted their motion but the Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that Celotex failed
to support its motion with negating evidence.183
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the Court of Appeals position was
“inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment”, that rule 56(c) summary judgment against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case and on which they will bear the burden of proof at trial.184 They further explain
that as a result there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, such a failure of proof concerning
an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case renders all other facts immaterial. 185 It is noted
that a motion for summary judgment can be made with or without supporting affidavits and the
burden on the moving party may be discharged by simply showing that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.186 Obtaining summary judgment is as simple as
pointing out through motion that the other party has not proven key information. The determination
of what constitutes a key element to one’s case remains open to judicial interpretation.
The last of the trilogy, Anderson originated as a libel suit in Federal District court between
a nonprofit corporation and the publishers of a magazine alleged to have made statements which
were false and derogatory.187 Liberty Lobby alleged that Anderson’s article portrayed the

181

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 (1986)
Ibid.
183
Ibid.
184
Ibid.
185
Ibid.
186
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 (1986)
187
Ibid.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An Illustration of the Tension between
Access and Efficiency in American Courts 34
182

organization and its founder as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist.188 After discovery,
Anderson moved for summary judgment asserting that because the respondents were public
figures, they were required to prove their case under the standards established in New York Times
v. Sullivan and that actual malice was absent as a matter of law.189 The District Court held that the
public figure exemption (arising from Sullivan) applied and entered summary judgment on the
grounds that the findings precluded a finding of actual malice.190 The Court of Appeals held that
the requirement that actual malice be proven need not be considered at the summary judgment
stage thus it was improperly granted.191
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals holding was overturned on the
grounds that the Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard in reviewing the District
Court’s grant.192 Their decision states that at the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s
function is only to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial and there is no issue unless
there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.193 According to the court, the appropriate inquiry is whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.194 The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine
issue of fact, but the plaintiff is not thereby relieved of his own burden of producing in turn
evidence that would support a jury verdict.195 It is noted that the mere existence of an alleged
factual dispute between the parties cannot defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
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summary judgment.196 The trial judge’s summary judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue
exists is whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could
reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.197 In setting this precedent, the court
essentially instructed judges to use their knowledge and experience to predict the possible case
outcomes in order to decide if it can move forward to trial.
The second set of cases for examination are from the recent past and deal specifically with
pleadings. Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) are the oft cited and
contended recent precedent setting decisions which have created a major deviation from Conley
and the tenets of original practice.
Bell began as a suit between subscribers of local phone and internet services and Bell
Atlantic along with local phone companies alleging that Bell violated anti-trust laws by agreeing
not to compete and exclude other competitors, allowing each local phone company to monopolize
its own market.198 The District Court dismissed their complaint concluding that parallel business
conduct allegations alone do not state a claim under the Sherman Act, additional facts must be
alleged which exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation.199 The Court of
Appeals held that Bell’s parallel conduct allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss because they failed to show that there is no set of facts that would permit plaintiffs to
demonstrate the parallelism was a product of collusion rather than coincidence.200
On appeal to the Supreme Court it was decided that stating a Sherman Act claim requires
a complaint with enough factual matter to suggest that an agreement was made, allegations alone
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will not suffice.201 They explained that Conley described the “breadth of opportunity” to prove
what an adequate complaint claims, but not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern
a complaint’s survival.202 Under the plausibility standard, the plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy comes
up short. Because the plaintiffs did not bring their claims across the line from “conceivable to
plausible”, their complaint was dismissed.203 In introducing this new standard, the court insisted
that asking for plausible grounds would not impose a “probability requirement” at the pleading
stage but raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.204
This opinion in practice dismissed notice pleading, the major holding of Conley upon which courts
relied for the liberal pleading standards of original practice and introduced the new plausibility
standard.
Two year later, in Ashcroft, often referred to as Iqbal, Javaid Iqbal, one of thousands of
Arab Muslim men detained during the FBI investigation into the September 11th terrorist attacks
alleged violations of his statutory and constitutional rights during confinement.205 The defendants
which included representatives of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and the FBI argued
they should be protected through qualified immunity as they were acting in official government
roles.206 The District Court denied their motion to dismiss and rejected their defenses.207 The Court
of Appeals decided to affirm on most counts, but on the issue of whether his complaint was
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss using the Twombly standard concluded that it was.208
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Twombly standard was put to examination. The court
explained that a claim has facial plausibility when “pleaded factual content allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”.209 It was
further established that two principles underlie Twombly. First, the idea that a court must accept a
complaint’s allegations as true is inapplicable to “threadbare recitals” of a cause of action’s
elements, supported by conclusory statements.210 Second, determining whether a complaint states
a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and
common sense.211 As for the examination process, a court considering a motion to dismiss may
begin by identifying allegations that because they are conclusions are not entitled to the assumption
of truth. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations.212 Next, when there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should “assume their veracity” then determine whether they
“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief”.213 Iqbal’s complaint did not contain facts plausibly
showing that the FBI policy was based on discriminatory factors. The court rejected three of his
arguments including his claim that Twombly should be limited to its antitrust context.214
Because Twombly interpreted and applied rule 8 which governs pleading in all civil cases,
according to the court, the case “applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike”.215 Here, the
court refuses to err in judgment regarding plausibility pleading and their interpretation of rule 8,
affirming for future cases that there is to be no doubt as to the application of Twombly’s new
pleading standard, it is by default for all cases decided in federal courts.
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IV. Why Change?
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were a new and radical experiment for American
jurisprudence, a distinct tilting of the power scales from the states to the federal government. The
issue of states rights, as seen through judicial history, largely mirrored an ongoing political battle
taking place across the nation. Though different eras saw different issues, the underlying question
remained the same: how much power does the federal government need?
For decades, citizens and statesmen alike operated on the default presumption that federal
courts located within state boundaries did not need formal procedural autonomy. One hundred and
forty five years elapsed between the creation of lower federal courts through the Judiciary Act of
1789 and the decision to place the power to promulgate rules for those courts in the hands of the
judiciary through the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. During that time, the nature of the legal
profession and litigation were major factors nurturing the complacency inherent among judges and
lawyers who worked under a patchwork of national rules. It was not until cases and law firms
expanded in number and size that both sides realized something had to change for the sake of
uniformity. In particular, change was necessary to secure the ability of lawyers to successfully
fulfill their duty in court. It is impossible to well represent a client without knowing the procedural
rulebook by which to play the litigation game as cases are often determined by one’s ability to
follow the rules more so than the existence of a legitimate claim for relief.
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 sought to remedy the ailment from which early 20th
century lawyers suffered by mandating that any rules promulgated by the Supreme Court would
supersede those at the time governing federal courts from state to state.216 Four years later, the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s enactment instantly created actual uniformity in federal court
procedure. These rules not only much such a groundbreaking achievement but also went a step
further. The review of original practice under the rules revealed that they had a character, motive,
and goal. The drafters purposefully created a largely liberalized, open system built around notice
pleading and focused on getting a trial on the merits for every potentially legitimate claim. Pound
believed that the formalism inherent in the common law writ system with its rigid procedural steps
hindered the “just application of substantive law” and its adaptation to modern circumstances.217
This notion of openness and flexibility in procedural law’s function was solidified by precedent,
making this the way federal courts worked for years until yet another change arrived.
In the mid to late 20th century, there is a marked shift away from the procedural tenets of
the third era. For various reasons, barriers were slowly but surely being erected in the paths to
justice for litigants. Among the major changes included plausibility pleading, increased judicial
discretion, and increased burdens for plaintiffs trying to prove they deserve a day in court. As a
result, the original spirit of the Federal Rules was largely eradicated. Clearly, there was a shift in
the philosophy underlying federal courts and specifically in the minds of those who make such
decisions regarding their function and methods. Every change is a reaction to a catalyst. Peeling
back the many layers to this issue reveals functionalism and ideology to be the motivating
perspectives behind actors on the sides of access and efficiency.
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Functionalism
In the third era, going to trial was a realistic expectation because costs were not prohibitive
and cases remained small.218 Courts tried cases at a relatively swift pace and delays rarely imposed
an undue burden on parties.219 Initially, the open court model, in practice, appeared to be working
well. In 1951, the median time from filing to disposition in federal courts was 12.2 months.220
However, eleven years later in 1962 the same measure rose to an average of 16 months.221 This
growth has been theorized to result, among other things, from the procedural system introduced
by the Federal Rules.
The writ system and single issue pleading which composed common law procedure that
translated into early America attempted to among other things, define, control, and contain
litigation.222 Containment is a historical principle, intended to have cases lead to predictable
results, constrain judicial discretion, and make civil participation easier.223 A contained and rule
laden system is what federal courts mainly operated under before the Federal Rules inception. The
expected result of lifting those restraints slowly but surely came to fruition after their imposition
and the supporting precedents.
Lax pleading gave plaintiffs an incentive to plead vaguely in hopes that discovery would
turn up material.224 Courts abiding by the Conley standard were inclined to deny motions to dismiss
because they could not tell enough about the plaintiff’s claim to decide if they would prevail at
trial, necessitating expensive discovery.225 Some federal judges perceived a pro-plaintiff shift in
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the power balance as broad discovery could impose substantial costs on defendants to the extent
of becoming the principal object of litigation rather than a device for helping resolve it.226 Hourly
billing actually became the norm once discovery became routine.227 Many lawyers saw the rules
as a mechanism to further client interests in a battle with the opponent rather than a tool to move
forward in litigation.228 The litigation explosion itself has been said to have occurred due to the
private sector counsel being fee hungry, claims that opposes call “fearmongering”.229
Soon after the rules went into effect, there were signs that lawyers and judges felt a need
to limit the system and there was an early movement to replace the federal pleading rule with a
more stringent one.230 On top of potential issues with the rules themselves, case types changed. At
the rules inception they were small and few, but over time the issues and cases became bigger.231
In the 1970s, the civil caseload absolutely exploded.232 From 1962-1975 and 1975-1983, the
number of filings doubled while the number of federal district judges only increased by 20% and
30% respectively.233 This increase in civil filings was fueled by plaintiffs seeking justice under the
relatively new statutory rights enacted in the 1960s.234 The private sector responded almost
immediately, from 1970-1984, the number of lawyers nearly doubled as with the size of firms,
fees, and litigation departments.235 In the public sector’s attempt to catch up, from the 1960s-90s,
Congress created hundreds of new jurisdictional grants but not enough to fully balance the judicial
workload.236
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As a result, cases could not be resolved by the old fashioned one-by-one method. The
judicial reaction to the perception that things were out of control was to take control. 237 The idea
of judicial management actually began in the 1940s but the increasing caseload of the courts
encouraged Chief Justice Warren to appoint a group of judges to determine a solution.238 They
developed a systemic approach for processing cases which was explicated in the Manual for
Complex Litigation.239 Case management became the prescription for all cases with a latent goal
of settlement to avoid the lengthy and expensive process of going to trial.240 To ensure everyone
was following the plan, courts switched to individual calendars and began measuring judicial
efficiency and timing for the first time, creating an incentive for judges to stay on task.241 Over
time judges came to have a larger staff, delegate duties, and mainly take on a supervisory role
leading to a level of bureaucratization within the federal judiciary, a change which has been said
to further discourage them from hosting trials.242
The functional perspective says that the courts must prioritize efficiency over access. The
increased complexity, magnitude, and number of cases led to cost and delay in the court system
soon following the inception of the federal rules. Many of those tasked with funneling these cases
through the system simply saw greater judicial control as the way out.243 The Federal Rules have
come under significant criticism from defendants, defense counsel, and judges themselves. These
individuals cite discovery abuse, expense and delay, excessive court rulemaking, unpredictability,
litigiousness, and an overly adversarial atmosphere among modern litigation as systemic failures
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fostered by the rules as proof that we need reform.244 Such critiques are not purely a matter of
interpretation but often quite real, the price paid for operating and maintaining the open court
philosophy. That considered, deviations from the original philosophy can certainly be born of
concern and not always ulterior motive.245
A review of district court decisions has made clear that federal courts are actively applying
the Twombly plausibility pleading standard to cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.246 The entire notion of plausibility pleading was motivated by a desire to develop a
stronger role for the motion to dismiss and supposed excess of meritless litigation, deter abusive
practices, and contain costs.247 At the same time, plausibility pleading has been said to “grant
unbridled discretion to district court judges” who become the judge and jury at times due to a triallike scrutiny of the merits which could very well be affected by judicial attitudes.248

249

These

potential issues have some claiming inconsistency in rulings, a legitimate concern in a procedural
system aimed at creating transsubstantivity.250

Ideology
Drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure knew the system they were creating lacked
restraint but their philosophy forced them away from more controlling methods.251 That change
from the previous common law influenced system created an ideological battle with two sides, one
which promoted rules that controlled litigation and the other which defended rules that open
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litigation.252 The two sides to the ideological battle include defendants who are often large entities
facing claims of varying meritiosity who naturally want a heightened pleading standard and
plaintiffs, citizens or civil protection counsel who believe heightened pleading would undermine
the national interest and leave critical information in the hands of defendants through unfulfilled
discovery.253 A major issue among open court supporters since the beginning of the fourth era is
the increasing disfavor of civil rights cases in the gatekeeping process, posing the question of
whether an issue central to our concept of liberty deserves to be pushed aside.254
Procedural rules are more than simple guidelines. The function of rules in litigation and
the role of such litigation in American society makes them a source of societal power. Because
every step of litigation is covered by procedure, the rules determine the ease or complexity of
pursuing claims and defending them. In summation, rulemaking is essentially the power to decide
the winners and losers of litigation. It is the power to assign, protect, or deny privilege in the realm
of litigation before the judge has to hear a single argument. This factor combined with the inherent
politicization of such a powerful thing means that procedural rules have a difficult time
maintaining a value neutral existence and are constantly subject to ideologically motivated
manipulation.255
The business community’s outrage at the pro-plaintiff aspects of civil litigation under the
federal rules began in the 1950s, however over time that influence spread to politics through
advertising campaigns which attacked politicians who supported “greedy plaintiffs and judges.”
256
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restrictions to court access and deterrents.257 Though the movement generated little legislation, it
enjoyed traction politically by bringing the issue to the forefront of voters’ minds. In terms of
ideology, Conservatism now bears a distinct tie to closed courts.
The Advisory Committee, Standing Committee, and other levels of the Judicial Conference
which promulgates federal court rules is composed of members appointed through a mainly
Conservative apparatus.258 These individuals tend to have strong affiliations with the business
community and specifically large businesses of the sort often defending themselves from civil
claims.259 Courts and Congress have mainly been hands off with compelled arbitration clauses and
laws on class arbitration as compelled private adjudication puts these issues outside the public
process and does not contribute to backlogs of cases.260 However, as a result, business entities have
been enabled to capture control over the manner and means for resolving disputes with their
customers.261 They end up with a built in adjudicatory and tactical advantage.262
Within the courts themselves, judicial attitudes and preferences have been observed in
action. It is of notable mention that 4 of 5 judges who constituted the majority in Iqbal along with
many judges and clerks today were members of law school Federalist Societies, groups formed for
conservative students to connect.263 The ideological link is not isolated to that single case. Brescia
and Ohanian studied 548 cases regarding employment and housing discrimination in federal court
from 2004 through 2010 in which the specificity of pleading was challenged.264 Their analysis
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revealed several potential judicial biases based on ideology, race, and gender. Among them was a
finding that judges nominated by Republican presidents ruled to dismiss 7% more often than those
nominated by Democratic presidents following the Iqbal ruling.265
There has been a difference in the nature of litigation over time. In 1962, 11% of all civil
cases before the court were tried, excluding those settled without court intervention increases that
number to 24%.266 In 2012, 1% of cases were tried while 99% were terminated by dismissal,
summary judgment, or settlement.267 For the 1% of cases that made it to trial, the medial time from
filing to disposition was 23 months.268
Rule 11 in particular had a disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs.269 Before
Twombly, such cases had a 61% dismissal rate, after Iqbal, the rate rose to 72%.270 Motions to
dismiss have been observed to be granted at five times the rate they were before Twombly.271 If
there is a covert ideologically motivated movement to permanently damage plaintiff’s ability to
successfully bring civil rights claims before the court, it has been a successful endeavor.
Biases are an inherent component of human nature to which lawyers, judges, and legislators
are not immune. Rulemaking is more than it appears to be at first glance, though tighter procedures
serve a functional role for an overloaded court system, there is no denying that such practices shut
the door to a particular group of litigants. The motivation to make such a choice by simultaneously
denying a salient civil rights crisis is often a matter of ideology rather than purely functional
thinking.
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V. The Duke Conference
Clearly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have a perceived and proven power over case
outcomes manifested through precedent and rulemaking. Previous chapters have assessed the
impact of these measures and various factors which motivated those in charge to follow through
with them. The other component to studying changes in civil procedure is an in-depth exploration
of how those changes take place, particularly through the means of rulemaking, the drafters
intended mechanism for generating procedural changes.
The Judicial Conference of the United States engages in near-constant revision of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through a labyrinth-like process involving multiple conferences,
mini-conferences, committees, and subcommittees. Rulemaking is mainly coordinated by the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, commonly referred to as the “Standing
Committee.”272 Beneath the Standing Committee are five advisory committees for each area of
procedure, one of them being the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of Procedure.273 These
committees are free to establish subcommittees for particular tasks or as temporal measures.274
Many actors are involved in an official capacity and a great number more regular citizens and
interest groups provide input during public comment periods, through scholarly contributions, and
recommendation letters. Procedural change is by no means made in secret, but it naturally involves
a level of sophistication and bureaucratic maneuvering that far exceeds that of the average citizen’s
comprehension. It is important to note that an open process is by nature a democratic initiative but
in practice, may not fully achieve those ends.
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Though rule changes are ongoing, over the last eight to ten years, the conference has
received complaints regarding the costs, delays, and burdens of civil litigation. 275 Major critiques
include the piecemeal method to rulemaking which has led to moderate changes and application
inconsistencies across jurisdictions.276 Not only have some of the allowances under the rules
themselves been challenged by lawyers and scholars but also the very method by which they have
been made.
In response to the growing distain, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee hosted the 2010
Conference on Civil Litigation in May at the Duke University School of Law, leading to its
common reference as the “Duke Conference.”277 The notion of hosting an actual conference to
determine the issues and coalesce on a general plan follows the style introduced to the judiciary
by the original movement that gave us the Federal Rules. Within this setting it becomes possible
to avoid the deficiencies of specialized committees and look at the litigation problems generated
by the rules with a broader focus.
In a report to the Chief Justice, the Conference purpose is described as “a disciplined
identification of litigation problems and exploration of the most promising opportunities to
improve federal civil litigation.”278 More than seventy judges, lawyers, and academics took part in
presentations while over two-hundred invited participants attended and contributed to
discussions.279 These individuals were selected from a cross section of the legal profession to
create a diversity of views and experience.280 The presentations featured empirical information,
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analytical papers, pilot projects, and approaches used by various jurisdictions in considering ways
to address the problems of costs and delays in the federal system. 281 A major focus of the
conference was empirical studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, the first of their kind
to face serious consideration since the committee’s 1997 conference.282
This study originated at the request of the Rules Committees to attain recent empirical
information regarding federal cases.283 The FJC studied federal civil cases that terminated in the
last quarter of 2008, including a survey of the lawyers to learn about their experience in the
cases.284 They also administered surveys for the Litigation Section of the American Bar
Association and for the National Employment Lawyers Association.285 In addition, The Institute
for the Advancement of the American Legal System conducted a study of the members of the
American College of Trial Lawyers.286 The Searly Institute at Northwestern Law School and a
grouping of large corporations provided information as well.287
The FJC study included 3,550 cases drawn from all cases terminated in federal district
courts for the last quarter of 2008, this sample was constructed to eliminate cases where discovery
was not used and include cases likely encountering litigation issues.288 Paying particular attention
to lengthy cases, it included every case lasting at least four years at each case actually tried.289
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Major findings included:





$15,000 median plaintiff discovery costs290
$20,000 median defendant discovery costs291
$850,000 95th percentile plaintiff discovery costs292
$991,900 95th percentile plaintiff discovery costs293

Despite these staggering costs of discovery in some cases, lawyers were said to view
discovery as “reasonably proportional” to needs of cases and the rules as working well.294 The
IAALS American College survey, whose respondents had more years of experience in the
profession and are selected from a small fraction of the bar, had greater dissatisfaction with current
procedure than other groups.295 The ABA Section of Litigation survey responses did not indicate
the same degree of dissatisfaction, but still greater than those of the FJC survey.296
Members of the plaintiff-oriented NELA felt the Civil Rules were not conducive to their
goal, but felt problems could be resolved with minimal reforms.297 They cited the issues of
application, local rules, discovery abuse, and abuse.298 The defense oriented side, the Lawyers for
Civil Justice, the Civil Justice Reform Group, and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform,
surveyed corporate counsel of Fortune 200 companies.299 These respondents reported that
litigation costs were too high, accounting for 1 in 300 dollars of U.S. Revenue (for non-insurance
or health care corporations) and continue to rise in a disproportionate fashion compared to
plaintiffs.300
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Major perceived difficulties for defendants:




Contested issues not identified early enough to forestall discovery301
Discovery imposing disproportionate burdens on parties and non-parties302
Adversaries imposing expenses without a responsibility to reimburse303

Major perceived difficulties for plaintiffs:




Costs of discovery resulting from efforts to evade requests304
Motions filed to impose costs rather than advance litigation305
Existing rules not as effective as they should be in promoting fairness306

Shared consensus was found over the need for greater judicial management, specifically
tailored to the needs of each case, a task which requires the creation of uniform standards without
interfering with judicial independence in responding to various cases.307 It was said that
cooperation and proportionality are necessary to foster judicial case management and suggested
means included ongoing education, the development of guidebooks, and more.308 A second area
of consensus was the idea that rule changes alone cannot generate improvements.309 As a result,
this conference faced disagreement over how much specific rules should be changed.310
The macro-level determinations made at the conference included changes to the rules, new
judicial and legal education, development of guidelines, and projects to test and refine continued
improvements, along with the development of materials to support these efforts. Though there was
a fair amount of discontent with the current rules structure, the report takes note that “the time has
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not come to abandon the system and start over”.311 Conference participants emphasized that the
rules fail not in content but in application.312 They considered it important to instead understand
why rules are not being enforced and how could alleviate the issues cited. Still, some rules were
sponsored for amendment, most of which received strong support and agreement over the need for
analysis.313
Whether or not to expressly allow departures from transsubstantivity principle was a
general question explored.314 Multiple papers and participants raised the possibility of increasing
the rule-based exceptions to the premise that each rule applies to all cases in the federal system,
generally as a result of subject matter and by complexity or amount at issue.315 Such suggestions
aim to reduce conflict with other rules systems or local rules, and channel cases into specific
tracks.316
The major focus of exploration for new amendments which dominated conference
suggestions was within the pleading and discovery provisions. Participants encouraged rule
amendments that would explicitly integrate pleading with limited initial discovery, increase
judicial supervision, and require the court to consider the potential for asymmetrical information
when deciding on a motion.317 Also explored was response requirements, asserted as an issue by
plaintiffs who claimed defendants typically fail to adequately comply.318 Partially as a result,
conference participants suggested the standard for pleading an affirmative defense parallel the
standard for pleading a claim.319
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On the issue of discovery, the report cites that empirical studies show discovery rules work
well in most cases.320 In those where it was problematic, the culprits were disproportionality or
abuse, actions which are costly for both sides of litigation but primarily defendants.321 Along with
the issues raised by overbroad discovery were unreasonable discovery responses.322 There was
significant support among plaintiffs and defendants for more precise guidance in the rules on the
obligation to preserve information relevant to litigation and the consequences of failing to do so.323
Large data producers have been “bewildered” by the scope of their obligations to preserve
information for litigation and made clear the importance of assurance that compliance will avert
severe sanctions for inevitable losses of electronic information.324 A conference panel produced a
proposal, “Elements of a Preservation Rule” which explained that careful consideration must be
given to the properness of framing a rule addressing preservation.325 Sanctions for failing to
comply vary by the jurisdiction, so conference participants suggested a rule establishing uniform
standards of culpability for different sanctions.326
Existing case-management rules allow a court to tailor the extent of discovery and motions
to the stakes and needs of each case, there was widespread support for reinvigorating these.327 The
contentious question was whether there should be changes in the rules or changes in how judges
and lawyers deal with them.328 Assigning cases to different "tracks" was suggested as another
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approach to rein in discovery.329 It was thought that this approach may begin by reinvigorating or
expanding on earlier tracking programs adopted by local rules.330
When it comes to strategies other than rules, judicial and legal education were established
as a priority. According to the report, the Rules Committees do not train judges or lawyers but are
“eager” to work with those responsible and ensure the rules, training, and supporting materials
reinforce each other.331 At the time, the FJC was planning for judicial education to implement
lessons learned about effective case management, exploring changes in how judges are trained,
and finding how changes can be effected through improved case management.332 These efforts
were to be supported by the development of materials for the use of litigants, lawyers, and
judges.333 It was determined that a future form of empirical research would be pilot programs to
test new ideas and identify successful strategies that can be adopted, generating additional
educational material.334
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Specific ideas generated during the conference are described below in Table 1.
Table 1: Duke Conference Suggested Rules Amendments
Rule 1
Rule 2
Rule 7
Rule 8
Rule 11

Become “less ambitious”335
Abandon transsubstantivity336 and create special provisions for complex cases or categories337
Require a certificate of good faith conferral between counsel, an ABA suggestion338
Revise the standard for pleading affirmative defenses339
Create a deadline to abandon claims or defenses340

Rule 12

The ABA suggested adding the requirement that except in complex cases, a court must rule
promptly on a Motion to Dismiss and must rule within 60 days after a full briefing341
Require consideration of discovery budget342 and a mandatory pre-trial conference343
Revise initial disclosures to prevent an unnecessary burden or pleading necessity, define the
scope of discovery, create limitations on requests, and suggest an expansion of topics for
conference 344
Resolve potential ambiguity in the rule and create limitations on e-discovery requests345
Revise the duty to preserve and sanctions346 by determining discovery obligations, when the
duty to preserve evidence and thus sanctions begins347
Remove the discovery hindrances to summary judgment, require prompt rulings due to delays
or failure to rule, and revise for general inefficiency348
- Revise pleading standards349
- Require greater judicial intervention350
- Create a system for cost shifting351
- Support rule enforcement352
- Deal with local rules inconsistency353

Rule 16
Rule 26

Rule 34
Rule 37(e)
Rule 56
General
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VI. The Road to…2015?
The Duke Conference both arose from and established the Judicial Conference’s continual
commitment to responsiveness. It was the concerns of litigators and judicial interest groups that
sparked the need for a serious discussion to suggest changes which may be executed through the
framework of the committee’s ongoing revision process. What separated this set of concerns from
the typical requests was their general rather than specific nature. Issues with the costs and time
involved in litigation caused by a lack of stringent rules or judicial willingness to apply existing
rules are rooted in multiple rules and provisions of them. It was clear that a targeted approach
would not offer resolve, nor would the presumption that rulemaking alone could provide a remedy.
Instead, the committee was to generate a multifaceted plan involving rules, education, and
research.

Early Developments
Following the Duke conference, the immediate task for the Rules Committees was to
prioritize the issues identified in the Conference for further study. 354 The Conference highlighted
two areas that merit attention:
1. Discovery in complex or highly contested cases including preservation and spoliation of
electronically stored information355
2. Review of pleading standards in light of the recent Supreme Court cases356
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It is important to note that the “optimistic” view of the Civil Rules was not universal.357
The Duke Subcommittee and Advisory Committee considered that “dramatic reform, even drastic
reform” was needed.358 They found it important to improve procedures for all types of litigation
while recognizing that some changes may take years.359 These long term projects include seeking
inspiration from well-functioning local district and conducting empirical studies.360
To deal with the many suggestions for rule amendments generated at the Conference, the
subcommittee worked to establish priorities among them before drafting.361 According to the
report, discovery of electronically stored information commanded “great attention” at the Duke
Conference.362 The Committee and Discovery Subcommittee began work immediately after the
conference, driving three rough sketches of possible approaches.363 The task of translating
suggestions in this area into a procedural rule was described as “formidable, perhaps
impossible”.364
The first sketch, directly responding to the Duke panel, sought to provide specific guidance
and defined preservation obligations in great detail.365 The second was similar, but substituted
general obligations for detailed directions.366 The third focused on sanctions, relying on backward
inference to shape preservation obligations.367 Each sketch was designed to provoke discussion
and further review. However, this was halted due to a variety of concerns from the subcommittee,
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which concluded it needed more information about the real-life dynamics of preservation problems
to determine whether rules could provide useful guidance.368 To obtain this, they decided to host
a mini-conference before the fall 2011 full committee meeting, extending an invitation to an array
of individuals experienced in preservation and general E-Discovery issues, including specialists in
technical and technological issues.369
This diverse group of experts and litigators came together with the Subcommittee and other
Committee members in Dallas on September 9, 2011.370 Many of the problems described here
involved costly over-preservation of potentially discoverable information.371 The participants
recognized that the duty to preserve is triggered by a reasonable expectation of litigation but were
uncertain as to what they must preserve.372 This creates a certain uneasiness as they have a great
aversion to the risk of sanctions in whatever litigation might actually ensue.373 The risks feared go
beyond any direct impact of sanctions but also the reputational effect of sanctions —being branded
as evidence destroyers.374 As a preventative measure, companies often preserve information for
litigation that is never brought.375 One anecdote described spending $5,000,000 to preserve
information, with costs increasing by $100,000 a month, all for litigation that had not yet been
filed.376 Others generally described preserving far greater volumes of information than were ever
sought in litigation that actually ensued.377 Participants further noted that preservation issues are
not limited to large institutions which typically have massive volumes of information subject to

See Advisory Committee, “Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee” (December 2011): 25
Ibid.
370
Ibid. p. 3
371
Ibid.
372
Ibid.
373
Ibid.
374
Ibid.
375
Ibid.
376
Ibid. p. 4
377
Ibid.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An Illustration of the Tension between
Access and Efficiency in American Courts 59
368
369

discovery, individual parties also can have substantial obligations, a potential ignorance that
should be considered.378
Discussion at the mini-conference generated some disagreement about the steps that might
be taken to address preservation problems, including whether the time has come to consider
drafting rule based solutions.379 Ultimately, the Committee was led to the conclusion that the
Subcommittee should continue to consider all approaches.380
Within the Discovery Subcommittee’s work beyond this conference and other meetings
was a reliance on empirical data and research which ran concurrent with the development of actual
rules. Initial research by Andrea Kuperman showed that federal courts have a mainly uniform
approach to the events that trigger a duty to preserve, all of which agree that a duty to preserve can
arise before litigation is actually filed.381 A reasonable expectation that litigation may be filed is
often what triggers the duty.382 However, no uniform case law on the scope, location, or age of
information that must be preserved was found and there were significant differences among the
circuits on what conduct can lead to sanctions.383
At this point, one year following the Duke Conference, early phase ideas for expediting
litigation multiple options had been developed. Some included:




Reduce the time for service in Rule 4(m) to 60 days after filing rather than 120384
Require actual scheduling conference between court and parties, avoiding
alternatives385
Add to list of optional contents of Rule 16(b)(3), a provision for setting a date by which
parties must abandon any claims or defenses that can no longer be asserted in good
faith386
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Initial Sketches and Challenges
According to the report, the pace of work quickened after the Standing Committee meeting
in June 2012.387 Beginning in July, the Discovery Subcommittee held eight conference calls to
develop its proposal.388 As this point, the Advisory Committee hoped for case-management
amendment ideas to be presented to the Standing Committee at its June 2013 meeting with a
recommendation for publication.389 This is the first mention of the rules being presented together.
According to the report they would form a “broad package of amendment ideas with new Rule
37(e)”.390 Rule 37(e) was both an ongoing project for the Rules Committees and a cited concern
at the Duke Conference.391
The “new” rule 37(e) of the 2006 E-Discovery Amendments provided protection against
sanctions for loss of electronically stored information due to the "routine, good faith operation of
an electronic information system”. 392 Revisions were intended to respond to an expanded amount
and variety of digital information along with potential costs and burdens.393 Part of the compulsion
to act resulted from the House Judiciary Committee holding a hearing in December 2011 on the
costs of American discovery which largely focused on the costs of preservation.394 After the miniconference and subsequent meetings, the Subcommittee decided to focus on the “Category 3
approach,” a proposed Rule 37(g) dealing with sanctions for failure to preserve information. 395
There were continual questions about how to refine this proposal, and beginning in early July 2012,
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the Subcommittee worked to prepare a final proposed rule for the full Advisory Committee
meeting in November 2012.396 Once it was completed, the Subcommittee turned to the issue of
whether this new provision should be a new Rule 37(g) or a replacement, ultimately deciding that
the current rule did not provide any further protections, so replacement seemed more suitable.397
The new rule’s main objective was to replace the disparate treatment of preservation and sanctions
issues in different circuits with a single standard.398 Also it encompassed a clarification that
sanctions could be employed only if the court found that the failure was willful or in bad faith, and
that failure caused substantial prejudice in the litigation.399 This was designed to provide protection
against inappropriate sanctions and reassure those who might be inclined to over preserve to reduce
the risk of sanctions.400 Not only was the amendment intending to raise the threshold for sanctions
above negligence, it also provided a uniform standard for federal courts and applied to all
discoverable information.401
The new rule 37(e) was presented to the Advisory Committee at its November 2012
meeting.402 All members except the Department of Justice voted in favor of submitting it to the
Standing Committee.403 The Department reported that it had not gathered input from internal
interested parties and could not vote in favor at the time.404 The concerns raised were not entirely
negative and the final rule proposal responded to most of the Department’s concerns.405
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In response to this proposal, the full Committee tasked the Subcommittee with addressing
concerns about rulemaking power, specifically due to the reach of new rule 37(e).406 The
Subcommittee met again within the month and considered these issues.407 Because the goal of
amended 37(e) was to achieve uniformity in the federal courts due to a diversity of local rules, the
subcommittee concluded there was “little reason” to expect it would violate the Rules Enabling
Act provisions.408
Beyond the intricacies of Rule 37, the Subcommittee began to narrow the list of
considerations which would make their way into the rules package, discarding possible changes
that were not “ripe for present consideration.”409 The proposals were at this point grouped into
three sets developed under the package mentality and with a goal that together they may encourage
significant reductions in cost and delay.410 These involved multiple rules and different parts of
those rules.
The first topics involved early stages of case management.411 Suggested changes included
shortening the time for service after filing, reducing the time for issuing a scheduling order, and
emphasizing the value of holding an actual conference before issuing a scheduling order.412 The
next set of changes involved the reach of discovery.413 They began with shifting the proportionality
factors, limiting the scope of discovery to relevant matter and modifying the provision for
discovery of information not admissible in evidence.414 More specific suggestions included
reducing the presumptive number of depositions and interrogatories, and for the first time
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incorporating presumptive limitations on the number of requests to produce and admit.415 Another
approach was a set of provisions to improve the quality of discovery objections and the clarity of
responses.416 The last proposal would revise Rule 1 to direct that the rules be employed by the
court and parties to secure its goals.417

The Published Rules Amendment Package
In January 2013, the Standing Committee approved publication of Rule 37(e) considering
that changes would be brought to the June meeting.418 The May 2013 report to the Standing
Committee recommended publication of the rules amendment package for public comment.419
This proposal was composed of Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 37.420
The rules proposals were grouped in three sets as previously determined. One set aimed to
improve early and effective judicial case management.421 The second sought to enhance the means
of keeping discovery proportional to the action.422 The third hoped to advance cooperation.423 The
rules involved in these three sets overlap.424 The following is a summary of each grouping:
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1) Case-Management Proposals
The case-management proposals reflect a perception that the early stages of litigation often
take too long, which incurs expense.425 These rule revisions aimed to expedite litigation to resolve
this difficulty for parties.
The drafters proposed revising rule 4(m) to shorten the time to serve a summons and
complaint from 120 days to 60 days.426 By having the action moving in half the time, it responded
to the commonly expressed view that four months for service was too long.427 Concerns that
circumstances occasionally justify a longer time to effect service were said to be met by the court’s
duty, (already in Rule 4(m)), to extend if the plaintiff shows good cause.428
Rule 16(b)(2), at the time of drafting provided that the judge must issue the scheduling
order within the earlier of 120 days after any defendant has been served or 90 days after any
defendant has appeared.429 The recommended revision cut the times to 90 days after any defendant
is served or 60 days after any defendant appears.430 The original plan called for a 50% reduction
but concerns that it may inhibit parties from adequately preparing for scheduling conferences
curtailed it.431 The Department of Justice and other attorneys raised concerns that the time required
to designate attorneys in a large organization is followed by identifying the right people in the
client agency to work with them and to begin gathering information necessary to litigate.432 They
suggested that more time to prepare would make for a better scheduling conference and more
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effective discovery in the end.433 Thus it was decided that the committee note should reflect that
extensions be “liberally” granted. 434
Rule 16(b)(1)(B) authorizes issuance of a scheduling order after receiving the parties’ Rule
26(f) report or after consulting "at a scheduling conference by telephone, mail, or other means”.435
The committee considered a proposal that would require an actual conference except actions in
exempted categories, but this was rejected after hearing from several judges and lawyers at the
mini-conference.436 This change is effected by requiring consultation simply "at a scheduling
conference”, exempting actions exempted by local rule.437 Creating a national rule was suspended
in favor of awaiting further inquiry into the categories exempted by local rules.438
With rule 26(d)(1) the Subcommittee considered proposals that would allow discovery
requests to be made before the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference in order to facilitate this meeting by
allowing consideration of actual requests, providing a focus for discussion.439 Some participants
in the mini-conference, particularly plaintiff counsel, said they would take advantage of this
procedure.440 Others expressed skepticism, fearing that requests made before the conference would
be unreasonably broad and resist change at the conference.441 Considering these concerns, the
Subcommittee concluded that the opportunity should be made available to advance the Rule 26(f)
conference.442
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2) Proportionality
Many proposals sought to promote use of discovery proportional to the needs of the case.443
A major driver of the litigation cost burden was said to be unbridled discovery that aims to incur
cost or seek information of questionable relevance. In the area of fostering proportionality, the
drafters sought to enact rules which would curtail this practice.
Several proposals were considered to limit the scope of discovery provided by Rule
26(b)(1) by adding a requirement of "proportionality.”444 However, addition of this term without
definition generated concerns that it would be too open-ended to support meaningful
implementation.445 At the same time, many participants in the mini-conference expressed content
with the current Rule 26(b)(2)(C) principles, citing implementation rather than rule text as the
problem, insisting it is not invoked often enough to dampen excessive discovery demands.446 These
considerations framed a proposal to revise the scope of discovery so it must be proportional to the
needs of the case considering among other things, whether the burden or expense outweighs its
likely benefit.447 Under the rule draft, party-controlled discovery became limited to "matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense” and court-controlled discovery extended to "any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action”. 448
Additional proposals reduced the limits in rules 30, 31, 33, and added to Rule 36 for the
first time, presumptive numerical limits.449 These included reducing the presumptive limit on the
number of depositions from 10 to 5 and the presumptive duration to 1 day of 6 hours.450 Reducing
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the presumptive limit on the number of depositions was considered at length.451 Some judges at
the Duke Conference expressed the view that civil litigators over-use depositions.452 At the same
time, many parties are opting to resolve their disputes through private arbitration or mediation
services because they do not involve depositions.453
Research by the FJC further supports these concerns.454 According to the data base
compiled for the 2010 FJC study, cases with more than 5 depositions ranged from 14% to 23% of
the pool, and an estimated 78% - 79% of these cases had 10 or fewer depositions.455 Other findings
included that each additional deposition increases the cost of an action by about 5%, and estimates
that discovery costs are "too high" tend to increase with the number of depositions.456 Some
lawyers who represent individual plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases have urged that
they commonly need more than 5 depositions to establish their claims.457 So, the Committee Note
addressed these concerns by stressing that leave to take more must be granted when appropriate.458
Shortening the presumptive length of a deposition from 7 hours to 6 hours reflects revision
of earlier drafts that would have reduced the time to 4 hours.459 The 4-hour limit was prompted by
experience in some state courts but several comments suggested that for many depositions, 4 hours
will not suffice.460
The proposal to reduce the presumptive number of Rule 33 interrogatories to 15 did not
attract much concern.461 There was some concern that 15 interrogatories are not enough even for
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some relatively small-stakes cases.462 Still, the Subcommittee concluded that 15 will meet the
needs of most cases, and it is advantageous to provide for court supervision in other cases.463
Multiple concerns did underlie Rule 34 proposals which sought to address objections and
actual production.464 Objections are addressed in two ways. First, Rule 34(b)(2)(B) would require
that the grounds for objecting to a request be stated with specificity. 465 Second, Rule 34(b)(2)(C)
would require that an objection "state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the
basis of that objection.” 466 These provisions aimed to respond to a common lament that Rule 34
responses begin with a "laundry list" of objections, produce volumes of materials, then conclude
that the production is made subject to the objections.467 The requesting party is typically left
uncertain as to whether anything actually has been withheld.468 Actual production of material was
addressed by new language in Rule 34(b)(2)(B) and a corresponding addition to Rule
37(a)(3)(B)(iv).469 The new provision directed that a party electing to produce must state they will
do so and directs that production be completed no later than as stated in the request or a later
reasonable time stated in the response.470 To match, rule 37 was further amended by adding
authority to move for an order to compel production if "a party fails to produce documents."471

See Advisory Committee, “Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee” (May 2013): 14
Ibid.
464
Ibid. p. 15
465
Ibid.
466
Ibid.
467
Ibid.
468
Ibid.
469
Ibid.
470
Ibid. p. 16
471
Ibid.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An Illustration of the Tension between
Access and Efficiency in American Courts 69
462
463

3) Cooperation
Only one rule was involved in the efforts to generate cooperation and that was rule 1 which
essentially functions as the federal rules purpose statement. Proponents insisted that reasonable
cooperation among adversaries is vitally important to successful use of the resources provided by
the Civil Rules and the explicit inclusion of this aim could help it be accomplished 472 Participants
at the Duke Conference regularly pointed to the costs imposed by hyper adversary behavior as an
example of the need for a rule that would enhance cooperation.473 Such a provision might be
limited to the discovery rules alone (which generates most complaints) or apply generally to all
litigation behavior.474 Consideration of drafts that would impose a direct and general duty of
cooperation faced multiple concerns.475 The first being that cooperation is an open-ended concept,
it is difficult to identify a proper balance of cooperation with legitimate, even essential, adversary
behavior.476 There also is a potential for risk that a general duty of cooperation could conflict with
professional responsibilities of effective representation.477 As a result, these drafts were abandoned
and the end proposal was a modest addition to Rule 1.478
In this, the parties were made to share responsibility for achieving the aspirations expressed
in Rule 1 by the underlined addition to the rule:
“These rules should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” 479
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Rule 37(e)
The proposed amendment to rule 37(e) focused on sanctions rather than attempting to
directly regulate the details of preservation.480 It provided a uniform national standard to support
imposition of sanctions with the exception of certain cases.481
A few issues were raised which the Committee aimed to resolve in revisions. Concern was
expressed about use of the word "sanction," which might have adverse significance. 482 Standing
Committee members felt that the proposed rule language may permit sanctions even in cases where
the loss of information was of minor significance.483 As a result, rule 37(e)(1)(B)(ii) was revised
to authorize imposition of sanctions (in the absence of a finding of willfulness or bad faith) only
when they irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity to present or defend against
the claims or defense in the litigation.484 According to the revised committee note, this was to be
determined by examining the importance of the lost information and exploring the possibility that
curative measures under subdivision (e)(1)(A) could reduce the adverse impact.485 If these
measures are impossible or fail, the court must determine whether the loss has irreparably deprived
a party of any meaningful opportunity to present or defend against their claims.486 The requirement
was further narrowed by looking to all the claims in the action.

487

Lost information may appear

critical to a particular claim or defense, but the drafters insist sanctions should not be imposed or
should be limited if the claims or defenses are not central to the litigation.488 The first two questions
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in the list for public comment invited input on issues related to those raised by the Standing
Committee discussion.489
Standing Committee members also raised concerns about proposed (B)(ii) and its potential
to allow the imposition of sanctions when information was lost by accident rather than focusing
on willful or bad faith losses.490 As a response, the Advisory Committee decided that changing this
proposal to focus on "the party's actions" rather than "the party's failure" resolved the problem.491
In addition, it was suggested that the term "substantial prejudice in the litigation" in rule
37(e)(1)(B)(i) as the burden for a party seeking sanctions meet in proving the effect of the
information loss be given further definition and the Advisory Committee was urged to invite public
comment on this topic, so it composed the third question in the list.492

Public Perceptions and Committee Responses
The Standing Committee approved the August 2013 publication of the proposed
amendments package, this included Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 37.493 The proposals,
along with others published at the same time, were explored at three maximum-capacity hearings
in November, January, and February, hosted in Washington, D.C., Phoenix, Arizona, and Dallas,
Texas, respectively.494 They were also addressed in more than 2,000 written comments submitted
to the Committee.495
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The Civil Rules Advisory Committee met in Washington, D.C., in November 2013.496 The
first day of the meeting was a hearing on the proposed Civil Rules amendments published for
comment in August.497 Forty-one witnesses testified.498 Cumulatively, the comments and
testimony generated responsive changes by the committees.
The Civil Rules Committee unanimously recommended that the Standing Committee
recommend most of the published proposals for approval by the Judicial Conference and adoption
by the Supreme Court.499 The Committee recommended that the Standing Committee withdraw a
few proposed amendments.500 According to the report, the parts that carried forward remained an
integrated package aimed at the same goals and those omitted were designed to contribute to these
ends, but the remaining package would “function well without them”.501
A substantially revised version of rule 37(e) was approved for publication at the June 2013
meeting.502 The invitation for comments included five specific questions on points highlighted in
the Standing Committee discussion.503 Many concerns were raised in extensive testimony and
voluminous comments.504 The rule text was revised extensively in response but the core of the
published rule remained.505
The Committee carefully studied the public testimony and comments.506 These came from
a variety of sources, most of which can be categorized as pro-access or pro-efficiency. On the
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access side were plaintiff attorneys, civil rights groups, some scholars, litigation groups, and legal
foundations.507 Supporting efficiency based initiatives were defense attorneys, large corporations
such as Google, Hewlett-Packard, and some litigation groups.508 According to the report, more
“balanced assessments” were provided by public agencies, judges associations, and organized bar
groups.509
Comments were divided, but largely supportive, on the proposal to amend Rule 1 to
advance cooperation among the parties, and on the proposals to amend Rules 4 and 16 to enhance
early and active case management.510 Reactions to the discovery proposals however, were
mixed.511 Many comments, often clearly reflecting pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant views, divided
“sharply” between strong opposition and strong support.512 Other comments provided more
balanced assessments, many of these came from public agencies or organized bar groups that
generated their positions in a process seeking to establish an acceptable common consensus.513
After considering all points of view, the Committee was “convinced” that the recommended
amendments will make the civil litigation process work better for all parties.514 The proposals are
explored per category below, in order of greatest to least public comments:

1) Discovery Proposals
The Advisory Committee recommended that the Standing Committee forward most of the
published discovery proposals for adoption, with a few revisions in rule texts and with expanded
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Committee Notes.515 The Committee also recommended that the Standing Committee omit
proposals for new and reduced presumptive limits for discovery under Rules 30, 31, 33, and 36.516
All that remained of these proposals were the parts that amended Rules 30, 31, and 33 to reflect
the proposal to transfer the operative provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to Rule 26(b)(1).517
For Rule 26(b)(1), which addressed the scope of discovery and proportionality, those who
wrote and testified about experience representing plaintiffs saw proportionality as a new limit
designed to favor defendants.518 They criticized the factors as subjective and so flexible as to defy
any uniform application among different courts.519 They further asserted that “proportionality”
would become a new objection to discovery requests or encourage parties to withhold information
by making determinations of nonproportionality, leading to increased motion practice, costs and
delay.520 They were especially concerned that proportionality would routinely overshadow the
extensive discovery needed to prove many claims that involve modest amounts of money but
important principles for plaintiffs and the public interest.521 These problems can be particularly
emphasized in categories of cases that involve “asymmetric information.” For example, plaintiffs
in many employment and civil rights actions have little relevant information, while defendants
hold all the important cards and reveal them only through extensive discovery.522 Most discovery
comments were from plaintiffs-side employment lawyers, citing the difficulties they already
encounter trying to discover enough information to avoid summary judgment and prove their
claims.523
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Other comments against proportionality came from sources such as members of congress,
judges and judicial associations, civil rights groups, and researchers.524 Some of these asserted that
proportionality would impose a new burden on the requesting party to justify each discovery
request.525 Others argued that the proportionality proposal is a solution in search of a problem, that
discovery in civil litigation is already proportional to the needs of cases.526 These arguments were
often coupled with the assertion that there is no empirical evidence to support concerns that
disproportional discovery is sought in a worrisome number of cases.527
The Committee considered these comments but remained “convinced” that the proposal
would constitute a “significant improvement” to the rules governing discovery.528 The Committee
reached this conclusion for three primary reasons: emphasis on proportionality at the Duke
conference, the history of proportionality and Rule 26(b)(1), and adjustments to the 26(b)(1)
proposal through committee note.529 According to the report, the Committee remained convinced
that the proportionality considerations “should not and will not increase the costs of litigation” but
instead will decrease the cost of resolving disputes without sacrificing fairness.530
Another rule involved in some level of debate was rule 26(c)(1) which originally authorized
an order to protect against “undue burden or expense”.

531

This authority included the ability to

allow discovery only on the condition that the requesting party bear part or all of the costs of
responding, which some courts were utilizing.532 According to the report, making the authority
explicit would ensure it being considered as an alternative to denying requests or ordering them
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despite the risk of imposing undue burdens and expense on the responding party. 533 To foster
balance, the Committee Note admonished that recognizing the authority to shift the costs of
discovery does not mean that cost-shifting should become a common practice.534
Next was rule 34, with three proposals for amendment.535 The first change would require
that an objection to a request to produce be stated “with specificity.” 536 The second permitted a
responding party to state that it will produce copies of documents or ESI instead of permitting
inspection, and may state a reasonable time for the response.537 The third required that an objection
state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. 538 These
proposals were well supported by the testimony and comments, though some issues were cited.539
A particular concern was that a party who limits discovery may not know what documents
or ESI it has not found, and cannot state whether any materials are being “withheld”.

540

This

concern was addressed by expanding the Committee Note to state that a party who does not intend
to search all sources should object by specifying the bounds of the search it plans to undertake.541
This objection could also serve as a statement that anything outside the described limits is being
“withheld”.542
Along the same lines, the proposals would add Rule 26(d)(2) to allow a party to deliver a
Rule 34 request before the Rule 26(f) conference.543 The comments on this proposal were mixed.544
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Doubts were expressed over whether anyone would seize the opportunity and fears were expressed
that requests would be inappropriately broad and encourage the requesting party to adhere without
taking account of good-faith objections expressed at the conference.545 Plaintiff lawyers were more
likely to say they would use the opportunity to provide advance notice of what should be discussed
at the Rule 26(f) conference.546 Defense lawyers were more likely to say they would welcome
receiving advance requests than to say that they would make them. 547 So, the Committee
recommended that this proposal be approved for adoption.548
Regarding the numerical limits proposals for rules 30, 31, 33, and 36, much contention was
had. The published proposals sought to encourage active case management and advance the
efficient use of discovery by amending the presumptive numerical limits to promote efficiency and
early discussion about the extent of discovery needed to resolve the dispute.549 Rules 30 and 31
would have been amended to reduce the presumptive limit on the number of depositions.550 Rule
30(d) would have been amended by reducing the presumptive limit for an oral deposition.551 Rule
33 would have been amended to reduce the presumptive number of interrogatories a party may
serve on any other party.552 And, for the first time, a presumptive limit would have been introduced
for requests to admit under Rule 36, excluding requests to admit the genuineness of documents
from the count.553
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These proposals garnered some support but also encountered fierce resistance.554 The most
basic ground of resistance was that the present limits in Rules 30, 31, and 33 work well.555 Many
expressed the fear that presumptive limits would become hard limits in some courts and would
deprive parties of the evidence needed to prove their claims and defenses.556 The comments further
suggested that there is no need or reason to change them, nor any experience that would suggest
requests to admit are so frequently over-used as to require introduction of a first time presumptive
limit.557
The proposals addressing depositions were further resisted by urging that many types of
cases require more than 5 depositions.558 Fears were expressed that opposing parties could not be
relied upon to agree on a reasonable number, that agreement might be reached only by
inappropriate trade-offs in other areas and the rule would be seen to express that 5 depositions are
the new ceiling of reasonableness.559 All of these concerns were commonly bundled into an
argument that reduced limits would generate more contentiousness and increased motion
practice.560 Resistance to the reduction of the presumptive number of interrogatories, and to
introducing a presumptive limit on requests to admit, was similar.561
Narrower concerns addressed the proposal to reduce the presumptive time for an oral
deposition from one day of 7 hours to one day of 6 hours.562 The Committee originally
contemplated a 4-hour limit, based on its success in some state courts.563 Prepublication comments
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expressed such “grave concerns” that the Committee decided to recommend a 6-hour limit
instead.564 Many comments, however, suggested the need for at least the full 7 hours in cases that
involve several parties, questioning based on lengthy documents that the respondent must review,
or obstructive behavior designed to “run the clock”.565
These concerns persuaded the Committee that was better not to press ahead with these
proposals, they were withdrawn from consideration.566

2) Early Case Management
The proposals aimed at encouraging early and active case management drew fewer
comments than the discovery proposals.567 The proposals to add to Rule 16 met general, but not
unanimous, approval.568 The Committee recommended the Rule 16 proposals for adoption without
change.569 However, the proposal to reduce the time for service under Rule 4(m) encountered
substantial opposition.570 The Committee considered these comments and recommended that the
time to serve be reduced from 120 to 90 days, rather than the earlier proposal to reduce the time to
60 days.571
In rule 16, the time for the scheduling conference was revised to be set at the earlier of 90
days after any defendant has been served, down from 120 days in the present rule, or to 60 days
after any defendant has appeared, down from 90 days in the present rule. 572 But the proposal also
added, for the first time, a provision allowing the judge to set a later time on finding good cause
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for delay.573 The concerns about these shortened times expressed in the testimony and comments
echoed concerns the Committee considered.574 They were based on the fear that the new times
may not suffice to prepare adequately, particularly in a complex case or one involving a large
institutional party that needs time to work through the complexities of its internal organization.575
The proposal added two subjects to the list of contents permitted in a scheduling order: the
preservation of ESI, and agreements reached under Evidence Rule 502, but there was no significant
objection to these provisions.576 However, it also listed as a permitted topic a direction in the
scheduling order that before moving for an order relating to discovery, the movant must request a
conference with the court.577 The Committee originally thought it may be desirable to adopt a premotion conference requirement, not simply a topic permitted for a scheduling order.

578

Many

courts have adopted such requirements by local rule and experience shows this practice is effective
in resolving discovery disputes quickly and at a low cost. 579 Due to the fact that what works for
some courts may not work for all, the requirement was not added.580
In Rule 4(m) which sets the time to serve, the published proposal sought to expedite
initiation of litigation by reducing this period from 120 to 60 days.581 The comments and testimony
led the Committee to recommend that the period be set at 90 days. 582 Many comments offered
reasons why 60 days is not enough time to serve process.583 Language was added to the Committee
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Note to recognize that even at 90 days, the new limit “will increase the frequency of occasions to
extend the time for good cause”.584

3) Cooperation
The published proposal amended Rule 1 to direct that the rules “be construed, and
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding”.585 The Committee recommended approval of this
proposal for adoption without change to either rule text or Committee Note.586 There was little
opposition to the basic concept of cooperation and any doubts that emerged went in different
directions.587 One concern was that Rule 1 is “iconic,” and should not be touched.588 Another was
that the rules directly provide procedural requirements, not professional responsibility, so
complicate these provisions may invite confusion and ill-founded attempts to seek sanctions.589
Doubts also were expressed on practical grounds as comments suggested that the proposed rule
was attractive as an abstract proposition, but would prompt the strategic use of “Rule 1 motions”
for dilatory purposes.590 None of these concerns seemed to warrant any change of the published
proposal.591
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Rule 37(e)
Though the new rule differed from the proposed amendment published for public comment
in August 2013, the Advisory Committee unanimously decided that republication would not be
necessary to achieve adequate public comment and would not assist the work of the Advisory
Committee on this subject.592 In general, two goals inspired this work, one was to establish greater
uniformity in the ways in which federal courts respond to a loss of ESI and the other was to relieve
the pressures that have led many potential litigants to engage in what they describe as massive and
costly over-preservation.593 Information from many sources, including detailed examples provided
in the public comments and testimony, supported the proposition that great costs are often incurred
to preserve information in anticipation of litigation, including litigation that is never brought.594
During the two years following the Duke Conference, the Subcommittee considered
several basic approaches but in the end, it became apparent that the range of cases in federal court
is too broad and diverse to permit specific guidelines.595 The Subcommittee chose instead to pursue
a different approach addressing court actions in response to a failure to preserve information in the
anticipation or conduct of litigation.596 Under this approach, the proposed Rule would not itself
create a duty to preserve instead taking the duty as established by case law.597 Researched showed
cases uniformly hold that a duty to preserve information arises when litigation is reasonably
anticipated.598 Although some comments urged that the rule should eliminate any duty to preserve
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before an action is actually filed, the Advisory Committee believed that a rule so limited would
result in the loss or destruction of information needed for litigation.599
The Advisory Committee’s Discovery Subcommittee began deliberating on appropriate
reactions to the public comments with a half day meeting in Dallas immediately after the third
public hearing.600 The Subcommittee held six conference calls after that meeting to examine the
issues raised.601 Many of the comments reinforced conclusions previously reached by the
Subcommittee, while others provided new insights.602
The Advisory Committee remained “firmly convinced” that a rule addressing the loss of
ESI in civil litigation was greatly needed.603 They arrived at this conclusion due to the explosion
of ESI in recent years affecting all aspects of civil litigation making preservation a major issue
confronting parties and courts causing a bewildering array of court cases.604 As a result, loss of
electronically stored information produced a significant split in the circuits.605 The public
comments demonstrated that ESI is over-preserved out of fear that some might be lost, they would
be viewed as negligent, and potentially sued in a circuit that permits serious sanctions.606 The
Advisory Committee sought to resolve this circuit split with a more uniform approach and was
satisfied that the new proposed rule would do so. 607
At the same time, the public comments made the Advisory Committee more sensitive to
the need to preserve a broad range of trial court discretion for dealing with lost ESI.608 Among
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other steps after its Dallas meeting, the Discovery Subcommittee took a look at cases addressing
the loss of information relevant to litigation.609 The public comments and this analysis highlighted
the wide variety of situations faced by when information is lost, and strongly underscored the need
to preserve broad trial court discretion in fashioning remedies.610 The revised rule proposal
therefore retained such discretion.611
The public comments also made clear that the explosion of ESI will continue and even
accelerate.612 Significant amounts of ESI will be created and stored not only by sophisticated
entities with large IT departments, but also by unsophisticated persons whose lives are recorded
on their phones, tablets, cars, social media pages, and tools not even presently foreseen. 613 The
litigation challenges created by ESI and its loss are predicted to increase, not decrease, and will
affect unsophisticated as well as sophisticated litigants.614 The Advisory Committee accordingly
concluded that the published proposal’s approach of limiting virtually all forms of “sanctions” to
a showing of both substantial prejudice and willfulness or bad faith was too restrictive.615 The
value of preserving judicial flexibility was reinforced by a related conclusion.616 One reason for
significantly limiting sanctions was to reduce the costly over-preservation that had been
emphasized.617 Many who commented noted their high costs of preservation, but none were able
to provide any precise prediction of the amount that would be saved by reducing the fear of
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sanctions.618 So the potential savings from reducing over-preservation, were deemed “too
uncertain to justify seriously limiting trial court discretion”.619
The Advisory Committee also concluded that any reference in the new rule to “sanctions,”
should be deleted.620 They found that allowing curative measures was appropriate for the loss of
ESI, and that drafting a rule became complicated if it sought to distinguish between curative
measures and sanctions.621 Further questions were raised during the public comment period about
the references in the published draft to “substantial prejudice” and “willful or in bad faith”.

622

Many comments urged that further definitions should be adopted.623 Similarly, the published
provision that allowed sanctions when the loss of information “irreparably deprived” a party of
opportunity to present or defend against the claims drew criticism.624 Many expressed concern that
it risked undoing the attempt to limit “sanctions” to circumstances of substantial prejudice and
either willfulness or bad faith.625 The terms were said to be subjective.626
In addition, the Advisory Committee recommended that the rule be limited to ESI because
it was the subject that launched the venture and to them most required uniform guidance.627 They
recognized that this decision could be debated but cited that efforts have shown it is very difficult
to craft a rule dealing with failure to preserve tangible things.628 The published rule sought to
accommodate such cases by allowing “sanctions” but this drew many comments suggesting that it

See Advisory Committee, “Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee” (May 2014): 38
Ibid.
620
Ibid.
621
Ibid.
622
Ibid.
623
Ibid. p.38-39
624
Ibid p.39
625
Ibid.
626
Ibid.
627
Ibid.
628
Ibid. p.40
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An Illustration of the Tension between
Access and Efficiency in American Courts 86
618
619

opened the door to avoiding the limits otherwise imposed on “sanctions”.

629

It was determined

that limiting the new rule to ESI avoids this complication.630
Further, practical distinctions between ESI and other kinds of evidence were found.631 ESI
is created in large amounts previously unheard of and often is duplicated. 632 The potential
consequences of its loss in one location often will be less severe than the consequences of the loss
of tangible evidence.633 ESI also is deleted or modified on a regular basis, frequently with no
conscious action on the part of the person or entity that created it. 634 These practical distinctions,
the difficulty of writing a rule that covers all forms of evidence, and others persuaded the Advisory
Committee that the new Rule 37(e), like the present, should be limited to ESI. 635 The Committee
recognized that the dividing line between ESI and other evidence may in some instances be
unclear.636 Still they concluded that courts are well equipped to deal it on a case-by-case basis and
that the reasons for limiting the rule to ESI outweigh any potential complications.637

Major elements of the new rule include:
Reasonable steps to preserve - the revised rule was designed to apply if ESI that “should
have been preserved” in the “anticipation or conduct” of litigation is lost because a party failed to
take “reasonable steps” to preserve it.638 Responding to issues cited by commenters about all
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parties potential liability, the Note recognizes that the party’s sophistication with regard to
litigation may bear on whether it should have realized what should be preserved. 639
Restoration or replacement of Lost ESI - if reasonable steps were not taken, and
information was lost as a result, the rule directs that the next focus should be on whether the lost
information can be restored or replaced through additional discovery.640 Proposed Rule 37(e)(1)
provided that the court may: upon finding prejudice, order measures “no greater than necessary”
to cure it.641 This proposal added a limit urged by many of the comments – that the measures be
no greater than necessary.642 The proposal said that the court must find prejudice to order corrective
measures, but did not say which party bears the burden of proving prejudice.643 Many comments
raised concerns about assigning burdens, noting that it is often difficult for a party to prove it was
prejudiced by the loss of information it has never seen.644
Adverse instructions - proposed (e)(2) provided that the court may645:
(2)

only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the
information’s use in the litigation:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable
to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

A primary purpose of this provision was to eliminate the circuit split on when a court may
give an adverse inference jury instruction for ESI loss by permitting adverse inference instructions
only on a finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another of the information.646
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Beyond these rule elements, the published proposal included a list of factors that it said the
court should employ in determining whether a party should have retained information and whether
it lost the information willfully or in bad faith.647 The list received much attention during the public
comment period.648 Some saw them as providing useful guidance to parties but others raised
substantial concerns about whether the list was incomplete and possibly misleading. As a result,
the eventual decision of the Advisory Committee was to remove the factors from the rule.649
Lastly, the published preliminary draft called for replacing present Rule 37(e) with the new
rule.650 The invitation for public comment included the question whether the present rule should
be preserved.651 There were some comments that favored retaining some of the present rule, but
the great majority saw no need for retaining the current rule once the new rule is adopted.652 Going
along with this, the Advisory Committee recommended replacing the current rule with the new
rule.653

Final Approval
The Advisory Committee unanimously approved and submitted the proposed amendments
with a recommendation that they be approved and submitted to the Judicial Conference at its April
2014 meeting.654 The amendments were subsequently approved unanimously by the Standing
Committee at its meeting in May 2014.655 From there, the Judicial Conference approved and
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forwarded the rules package to the Supreme Court in September 2014.656 In April 2015, the
amendments were submitted to Congress for approval by Chief Justice Roberts, who ordered them
effective on December 1, 2015 absent any Congressional action to reject or modify.657
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VII. Analysis
The journey these rules travelled ostensibly began with the 2010 Duke Conference, but
philosophically originated centuries ago. Tracing that path from the beginning reveals a major
process aimed at achieving centrality and balance among competing interests. One of the
mechanisms for doing that is to make parties abide by the same rules. However, over time, this
notion itself became complicated through the expansion of litigation due to the American
economic booms and rights movements. It is at this point that the tensions between access and
efficiency in generating and applying the federal rules become apparent as acting influences on
the court’s function.
Original rules practice espoused the liberal ethos that the courts and litigation itself are
designed to be open and rules are guidelines rather than absolute truths. When the courts became
burdened with a high caseload, partially as a result, voices from the side of efficiency began to win
the private and public battle. Now, modern rules practice is characterized by a mainly closed court
that is focused on the duration and necessity of litigation, a concern catalyzed by fiscal interests,
typically those of large corporations who have much at stake. Considering this, it is little surprise
that the push to foster court efficiency even if it hinders access has grown significantly and enjoyed
success. In fact, the entire purpose for hosting the 2010 Duke Conference was to respond to
efficiency based complaints by generating a rules package. The Advisory Committee was in the
beginning more attentive to the needs of one side and merely accommodating the other views.
It is clear from the issues cited at the conference that the classic opposing sides, plaintiffs
and defendants, have different viewpoints of how litigation should take place. The chief complaint,
rising litigation costs, was as usual an issue cited mainly by defendants. The FJC survey reviewed
from this perspective shows a two-sided story. Defense counsel essentially cited the size and scope
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An Illustration of the Tension between
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of plaintiff requests as in need of limitation while plaintiff counsel characterized their behavior as
arising from the unresponsiveness and dodgy nature of defendants.658 There was little consensus
as to why costs are rising but there was agreement regarding who can halt the process. 659 Both
sides agreed that judicial management and uniform application of rules should be a priority.660
Regarding the proposed rule amendments in general, the suggestions can be summated as
limitations. Though participants cited other remedies for procedural deficiencies, many saw
additional restraints made explicit through new rules or rule revisions as the solution. Sketches for
revisions that addressed e-discovery preservation, required prompt responses from parties and
rules from judges, requirements of conferral among the court and parties, and even special
litigation tracks were discussed.661 This considered, it is entirely reasonable to say that the Duke
Conference leaned towards efficiency by any means possible.
What happened next further reveals the operative philosophy of the drafters. In the May
2013 report, three sets of rules proposals were revealed for upcoming publication and public
comment including case management, discovery, and cooperation. Within each category, the
proposals focused on increased rulemaking and restraint in the name of court efficiency. Ideas to
improve case management included expediting the early litigation process by measures such as
shortening the time for service and issuing of scheduling orders, and permitting early discovery
requests.662 Along the same lines, a myriad of ideas were sketched out for improving discovery,
the major alleged device for rampant costs. These included explicit instructions to ensure
proportionality, reduce excessive requests and presumptive limits, expedited document
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production, and uniform national sanctions for failure to preserve information.663 Finally, the
drafters aimed to foster cooperation by revising rule one to explicitly include this among the goals
of litigation.664
Naturally, a number of these proposals came under heavy criticism once published. The
case management proposal for rule 4(m) reducing the time to serve was heavily contended. 665 The
original proposal reduced the time by 50% which many responders cited was not reasonable, in
response the final version of the rule featured a 25% reduction instead.666 Discovery provisions
were also a source of debate. Among these was the original sketch to reduce presumptive numerical
limits on depositions and interrogatories, which was completely dropped after the committee
reviewed comments and listened to testimony indicating dissent.667 Again, the unreasonableness
of cutting the limits down so far and creating a new burden, most likely for plaintiffs already
struggling to present their claims, was put forth and the committee was entirely responsive.
Similarly, the process rule 37(e) went through is somewhat an example of committee
responsiveness. The public brought forward a need for more judicial discretion in ESI loss cases
due to variability and definitional problems with some terms such as “sanctions”.668 In response
to both these and Standing Committee concerns, they decided to limit the rule to ESI failure to
preserve guidelines, omitting the terms with definitional problems and generally providing what
should occur in a willful or negligent loss case. 669 It does not expressly provide what should be
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preserved, which was an early request from large data producing entities who must anticipate
litigation, but avoids doing so due to a literal inability.670
This pattern of responsiveness was not consistent, other actions displayed the committee’s
willingness to make precarious judgment calls against the urging of public commenters. For
example, the addition of a proportionality requirement for Rule 26(b)(1) in reference to discovery
was cited as helping defendants, particularly in cases with asymmetrical information such as
employment discrimination or other civil rights cases.671 If the defendant has vastly more
information than the plaintiff, discovery within the case is nearly guaranteed to be nonproportional. The final decision on the rule from the committee was to pursue proportionality
anyway, offering a three point reasoning for their choice.672 Though judges will still have
significant discretion in determining how to apply the rule, the potential for plaintiff’s discovery
requests to come under greater scrutiny has undoubtedly been implemented and the dissenters
predictions are likely to ring true in some circuits.
Ultimately, the rules drafting and revision process between the 2010 Conference and their
submission to Congress displays marked differences from beginning to end. They began with a
very stringent set of proposals set forth at the conference to create a more efficient procedural
system which through a fairly representative democracy based method, became a more scaled back
proposal. Unlike the 1938 drafters, the committee members did not carry an explicit ideological
goal to open or close the courts. While acting in the name of efficiency, their response to public
outcry in most of the proposals that received complaints was to act accordingly. In some, they took

See Advisory Committee, “Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee” (May 2014): 37-40
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on the representative role and decided in terms of what would be for the greater good which is still
to be determined.
A common perception among current litigators is that the new time limits in rules 4 and 16
will simply require more forethought and planning on the behalf of parties.673 But most focus more
on the rule 26(b) amendment to include proportionality and remove the classic authorization of
any “matter relevant to the party’s claim or defense” that invited more expansive discovery
requests.674

675

Some attention has been given to changes to the rule 34 document production

requests.676 677Also, the revision of rule 37(e) is widely regarded as a big deal for e-discovery due
to establishing a uniform test to establish that culpability in the loss of ESI and provision remedies
when preservation has not been met.678

679 680

Generally, legal scholars and legal bloggers have

made the new rules a focus and seem to take part in sharing this knowledge with others in the
profession. Likewise, the profession’s leadership has sought to provide guidelines for dealing with
the changes. The American Bar Association Section of Litigation and Duke Law Center for
Judicial Studies are jointly presenting a thirteen city series of dialogues681. Their stated goal is to
“further the understanding of the case management techniques that will help courts and litigants
realize the Amendments’ full potential to make discovery more targeted, less expensive and more
effective in achieving justice”.682 Each three hour program features leaders from the Rules
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amendment process, panel discussions among judges and litigators, all to walk participants through
application of the new rules using hypothetical cases and techniques.683

The View from the Bench
While every bit of academic research is helpful in furthering the current knowledge
regarding the Federal Rules and their impact, it is highly important to note the relevance of judges
and court staff in this process. Though some are already noted in research as taking part in the
drafting of rules or making suggestions, all federal court judges who handle civil cases and their
staff are on the front lines of implementation. Currently, there are 678 district court judgeships
across the nation entrusted to abide by the procedural rules designated for their cases.684 The
successful implementation and usage of these rules furthers their legitimacy and impacts the
ongoing amendments.
To capture a sample of judicial reactions and plans, several interviews were conducted in
November 2015 focused on judicial staff in the Middle District of Florida.685 The results generally
show that staff are aware of and preparing for upcoming changes. However, three of four
interviewees explained that because the rules are not effective until December 1st, they are not a
current priority.686 Two in particular noted that they will not study the changes until they are
official. 687
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As for changes they are paying attention to, amendments to rules 4m, 16, 26, 37, and 55
were cited with rule 26 mentioned by each interviewee. There was a lack of unanimity over the
impact of reducing the time for service. One staff member shared that this change would “make
cases move faster” and put more pressure on court employees to help everyone be motivated to
bring cases to their conclusion, describing this change as “a good thing.”

688

court exists to “serve the parties” and wants to “do things that help them.”

They noted that the

689

However, another

said this would affect the day to day function of the court and could cause conflict with local rules,
creating a potential need for local rule revision. 690 They further shared that these provisions make
it seem that the court makes all decisions regarding deadlines when in reality parties do.

691

Yet

another staff member took a slightly different perspective, explaining that anytime the federal rules
change, it could obviate the need for a local rule, so the court may simply have to adapt. 692
Regarding discovery provisions, two interviewees provided a mainly neutral perspective
on the upcoming changes. One commented that the rule 26 change is “important” going forward
because it makes the costs of discovery an important factor for the court to take into account in
determining whether to order production. 693 They also noted that due to the rule 37 amendments,
the court will know going forward “what we are going to sanction people for doing,” indicating
that there were previously grey areas regarding accidentally deleted information.

694

The other

interviewee who commented on discovery provisions made a general statement that “some aren’t
too drastic” but will make explicit what was already implicit.
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Regarding specific provisions,
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they said that rule 26’s new proportionality component would change how orders are drafted and
how things are considered. 696
Overall, though responses were few partially due to a general apprehension towards
commenting on such a sensitive matter, they were mainly consistent. Judicial staff perceive that
the 2015 amendments are going to change how their office functions, in some aspects causing
improvement and in others creating new obligations. Though keenly aware of their impact on a
case’s success, the rules to those who actually do the work of applying them are simply rules. At
this level, philosophical trends and ideological motivations are irrelevant for staff acting in an
official capacity. Their major concerns seem to exist in terms of ensuring proper implementation
and adjusting their patterns accordingly. Considering these findings, the rules package appears to
be facing a generally positive reception and should be implemented as intended.
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VIII. Conclusion
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a fascinatingly complex staple of American
jurisprudence for which points of fixation are built around the fact that rulemaking assigns winners
and losers. Initially praised for the amazing feat of bringing uniformity out of an uncoordinated
and relatively new judicial system, the rules have become a serious source of contention in the
legal profession as a realization of their true power emerged over the 20th century. Tracing this
part of judicial history shows that as awareness rose for all interests, the court was closed to average
litigants through procedural changes and precedent setting opinions. This process is what shows
us the two sides of the philosophical battle which re-emerged, proponents of access and proponents
of efficiency.
Much of modern rule practice is characterized by a distinct leaning towards efficiency, one
that appears to have won the most recent battle through the survival of rules amendments and
precedent promoting expedient and reasoned litigation. Though efforts were successfully made to
curtail the extent of these proposals, the anticipated and potential impact remains substantial.
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Appendix
Judicial Staff Interviews

This appendix contains the survey instrument for phone interviews with judicial staff.
Participants were solicited in November 2015 by direct phone calls to thirteen offices of judges
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, including both District and
Magistrate Judges. Of the thirteen contacted, four participated in the interviews, all of whom
requested to remain anonymous. Questions employed varied slightly based on their willingness
to engage in discussion, but generally included the following:



How are you preparing for the upcoming rule changes?



How do you know the rules are changing and when do you start paying attention?



What changes do you anticipate for the court?



What are your perceptions of the new rules?



Do you think the changes will work well with local rules?
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